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Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment

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  • Ewerhart, Christian
  • Schmitz, Patrick W

Abstract

Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson (1990) have conjectured that exclusive use of negligence liability leads to suboptimal choice of precaution in the presence of uncertainty and that ex ante regulation can correct these inefficiencies. We complete their argument by making a mild additional premise.
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Suggested Citation

  • Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W, 1998. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 1027-1027, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:88:y:1998:i:4:p:1027
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    as
    1. Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Starbird, S. Andrew, 2000. "Designing Food Safety Regulations: The Effect Of Inspection Policy And Penalties For Noncompliance On Food Processor Behavior," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 25(2), pages 1-20, December.
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the joint use of liability and safety regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 371-382, September.
    3. Dharmapala, Dhammika & Hoffmann, Sandra A. & Schwartz, Warren, 2001. "A Neglected Interdependency in Liability Theory," Discussion Papers 10626, Resources for the Future.
    4. Beckmann, Volker & Soregaroli, Claudio & Wesseler, Justus, 2010. "Ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability under uncertainty and irreversibility: governing the coexistence of GM crops," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 4, pages 1-33.
    5. Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme & Hiriart, Yolande, 2005. "The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors," CEPR Discussion Papers 4992, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    JEL classification:

    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

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