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Citations of
Patrick W. Schmitz

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

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Working papers

  1. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Stefanie Aniela Lehmann, 2008. "When Randomization in Collective Tournaments is Profitable for the Principal," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse19_2008, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 2009. [Downloadable!]
    2. Matthias Kräkel & Anja Schöttner, 2009. "Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse8_2009, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Matthias Kräkel & Anja Schöttner, . "Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply," Discussion Papers 264, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]

  2. Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases," IZA Discussion Papers 3481, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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    Cited by:

    1. Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?," Working Papers 0463, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6807, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    Cited by:

    1. Oechssler, Jörg, 2009. "Searching beyond the lamppost: Let’s focus on economically relevant questions," Working Papers 0486, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    2. Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 08-05, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks," CEPR Discussion Papers 7056, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  7. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6467, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Cited by:

    1. Evelyn Korn & Stephan Meisenzahl, 2009. "Contracting still matters! Or: How to design a letter of intent," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200909, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
    2. Ofer Grosskopf & Barak Medina, 2007. "Rationalizing Drennan: On Irrevocable Offers, Bid Shopping and Binding Range," Review of Law & Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(2). [Downloadable!]
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  9. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse25_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Kräkel & Anja Schöttner, 2009. "Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse8_2009, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Matthias Kräkel & Anja Schöttner, . "Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply," Discussion Papers 264, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    2. Matthias Kräkel, 2008. "Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse16_2008, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  10. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Macchiavello, Rocco, 2007. "Financial Constraints and the Costs and Benefits of Vertical Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 6104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 6988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    5. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks," CEPR Discussion Papers 7056, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:

  11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse25_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2006. "'Build It or Not': Normative and Positive Theories of Public-Private Partnerships," CEPR Discussion Papers 5610, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Hueth, Brent & Marcoul, Philippe, 2007. "The Cooperative Firm as Monitored Credit," Staff Paper Series 508, University of Wisconsin, Agricultural and Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]
    5. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Patrick Schmitz, 2008. "Task scheduling and moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 307-320, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    6. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse26_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    7. Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2009. "Task assignment, incentives and technological factors," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(1), pages 43-55. [Downloadable!]
    8. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  12. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points," CEPR Discussion Papers 4264, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Cited by:

    1. Shunda, Nicholas, 2009. "Auctioning with Aspirations: Keep Them Low (Enough)," MPRA Paper 16242, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Suren Basov & Svetlana Danilkina, 2007. "Auctions with Opportunistic Experts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1). [Downloadable!]
    3. Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 6476, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    4. Florian Englmaier & Arno Schmöller, 2008. "Reserve Price Formation in Online Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    5. Tim Hoppe & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2007. "An Experimental Assessment of Confederate Reserve Price Bids in Online Auction," FEMM Working Papers 07011, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management. [Downloadable!]
    6. Nicholas Shunda, 2007. "Auctions with a Buy Price: The Case of Reference-Dependent Preferences," Working papers 2007-42, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  13. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 4031, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Elke Jahn & Thomas Wagner, 2005. "Contractual Employment Protection and the Scarring Risk of Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 1813, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    2. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse25_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse26_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  14. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Emanuel Ornelas & John L. Turner, 2008. "Protection and International Sourcing," CEP Discussion Papers dp0900, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    2. Pol Antràs & Robert W. Staiger, 2008. "Offshoring and the Role of Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 14285, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Working Papers 04-21, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse26_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    5. Kazumi Hori, 2006. "Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
    6. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2008. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers 7066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  16. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," MPRA Paper 12531, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 6988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005)," MPRA Paper 6977, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    7. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 1998. "Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern," MPRA Paper 6941, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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    8. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse7_2006, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    9. Kazumi Hori, 2006. "Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
    10. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

  17. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 12532, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Licensing under Asymmetric information," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/13, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Licensing in a Vertically Separated Industry," Industrial Organization 0211005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Bharat Bhole, 2006. "Commercial Development of University Research: The Role of Patents," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]

  18. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Boockmann, Bernhard & Thurner, Paul W., 2002. "Flexibility Provisions in Multilateral Environmental Treaties," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-44, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Yin-Fang Zhang & David Parker & Colin Kirkpatrick, 2008. "Electricity sector reform in developing countries: an econometric assessment of the effects of privatization, competition and regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 159-178, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    3. Bernhard Ganglmair, 2008. "Breakup of Repeat Transaction Contracts, Specific Investment, and Efficient Rent-Seeking," JEPS Working Papers 08-001, JEPS. [Downloadable!]
    4. Lyons, Sean & Fitz Gerald, John & McCarthy, Niamh & Malaguzzi Valeri, Laura & Tol, Richard S. J., 2007. "Preserving Electricity Market Efficiency While Closing Ireland's Capacity Gap," Quarterly Economic Commentary: Special Articles, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), vol. 2007(3-Autumn), pages 62-82. [Downloadable!]
    5. Zhang, Yingang & Parker, David & Kirkpatrick, Colin, 2004. "Competition, Regulation and Privatisation of Electricity Generation in Developing Countries: Does the Sequencing of the Reforms Matter?," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30599, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM). [Downloadable!]
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    6. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, . "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
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    7. Harrison, Mark & Markevich, Andrei, 2007. "Quantity Versus Quality in the Soviet Market for Weapons," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 822, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    8. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Working Papers 04-21, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    9. Parker, David & Kirkpatrick, Colin, 2002. "Researching Economic Regulation in Developing Countries: Developing a Methodology for Critical Analysis," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30665, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM). [Downloadable!]
    10. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    12. Helmut Bester, 2009. "Investment and the Holdup Problem in a Matching Market," Discussion Papers 263, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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    13. Yin-Fang Zhang & David Parker & Colin Kirkpatrick, 2005. "Assessing the Effects of Privatisation, Competition and Regulation on Economic Performance: The Case of Electricity Sector Reform," SCAPE Policy Research Working Paper Series 0511, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics, SCAPE. [Downloadable!]
    14. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," MPRA Paper 12536, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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    15. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  19. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 2679, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Cited by:

    1. Blonski, Matthias & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2002. "Relational Contracts and Property Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 3460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:

  20. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances," CEPR Discussion Papers 2698, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Oliver Gürtler, 2006. "Optimal Ownership Structures in the Presence of Investment Signals," Discussion Papers 103, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    4. Binenbaum, Eran & Pardey, Philip G., 2005. "Collective Action in Plant Breeding," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19530, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
    5. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March. [Downloadable!]
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    6. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2004. "Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2004/478, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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    7. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts," MPRA Paper 12534, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sorensen, 2002. "Professional Advice: The Theory of Reputational Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 02-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  22. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Elisabetta Iossa, 2005. "Delegation of Contracting in the Private Provision of Public Services," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/125, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Xavier Fageda & Germa Bel, 2008. "Choosing hybrid organizations for local servicesdelivery: An empirical analysis of partial privatization," IREA Working Papers 200803, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Apr 2008. [Downloadable!]
    3. Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & Evagelos Pafilis, 2009. "Reputation and Ownership of Public Goods," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 09/211, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
    4. John Bennett & Elisabetta Iossa, 2007. "Contracting Out Public Service Provision to Not-for-Profit Firms," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 07-08, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks," CEPR Discussion Papers 7056, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  23. Anke Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann & Patrick Schmitz, 2000. "Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse19_2000, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Spiegel, Yossi, 2003. "Optimal State-Contingent Regulation under Limited Liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 3920, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," MPRA Paper 12536, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit de Geest, 2004. "When Will Judgment Proof Injurers Take Too Much Precaution?," Working Papers 04-27, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    2. Thomsen, Michael R. & Ollinger, Michael & Crandall, Philip G. & O'Bryan, Corliss, 2008. "Mandatory Food Recalls," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6083, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
    3. Dhammika Dharmapala & Sandra A. Hoffmann, 2002. "Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of Precaution," Working papers 2002-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    4. Gerrit de Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2005. "Soft Regulators, Though Judges," Working Papers 05-06, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    5. Ingo Vogelsang & Nishal Ramphal & Stephen Carroll & Nicholas Pace, 2007. "An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 87-104, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    7. Eef Delhaye, 2004. "Traffic safety: speed limits, strict liability and a km tax," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0407, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment. [Downloadable!]
    8. Garoupa, Nuno & Obidzinski, Marie, 2006. "The Scope of Punishment: An Economic Theory of Harm-Based vs. Act-Based Sanctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5899, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    9. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2002. "Modeling the Choice Between Regulation and Liability in Terms of Social Welfare," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-13, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    10. Hoffmann, Sandra & Schwartz, Warren & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2001. "A Neglected Interdependency in Liability Theory," Discussion Papers dp-01-13, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
    11. Stefan Felder & Anja Olbrich, 2009. "Dealing with Excessive Off-label Drug Use: Liability vs. Patent Prolongation," Ruhr Economic Papers 0114, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen. [Downloadable!]
    12. Francesco Parisi & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2003. "The Economics of Tort Law: A Précis," Working Papers 03-13, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    13. Anja Olbrich, 2008. "The optimal negligence standard in health care under supply-side cost sharing," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 73-85, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    14. Sébastien ROUILLON (GREThA), 2008. "Variable Probabilities of Suit and Liability Rules," Cahiers du GREThA 2008-15, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée. [Downloadable!]
    15. Iljoong Kim, 2008. "Securities laws ‘facilitating’ private enforcement," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 17-38, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    16. Giraud-Heraud, Eric & Grazia, Cristina & Hammoudi, Abdelhakim, 2007. "Agrifood safety standards, market power and consumer misperceptions," 105th Seminar, March 8-10, 2007, Bologna, Italy 7849, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]

  25. Schmitz, Patrick & Dirk Sliwka, 1999. "On Synergies and Vertical Integration," Discussion Paper Serie A 602, University of Bonn, Germany.
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  26. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1999. "Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts," MPRA Paper 12533, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Fehr, Ernst & Kremhelmer, Susanne & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2005. "Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 5369, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 6988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    5. Daniel Göller & Alexander Stremitzer, 2009. "Breach Remedies Including Hybrid Investments," Discussion Papers 282, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    6. Andras Niedermayer, 2007. "On Platforms, Incomplete Contracts, and Open Source Software," Diskussionsschriften dp0707, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
    7. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2004. "Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2004/478, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    9. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:

  27. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment," MPRA Paper 13448, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Starbird, S. Andrew, 2000. "Designing Food Safety Regulations: The Effect Of Inspection Policy And Penalties For Noncompliance On Food Processor Behavior," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 25(02), December. [Downloadable!]
    2. Hoffmann, Sandra & Schwartz, Warren & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2001. "A Neglected Interdependency in Liability Theory," Discussion Papers dp-01-13, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," MPRA Paper 12536, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  28. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "On Randomization in Coalition Contracts," MPRA Paper 13446, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998)," MPRA Paper 6972, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 1998. "Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern," MPRA Paper 6941, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

  29. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information," MPRA Paper 6549, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Hellwig, Martin, 2003. "A Utilitarian Approach to the Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 03-36, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods," Discussion Papers 265, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    3. Martin Hellwig, 2006. "The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_21, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2008. "Toward an Efficiency Rationale for the Public Provision of Private Goods," NBER Working Papers 13827, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    5. Bernd Huber & Marco Runkel, 2004. "Tax Competition, Excludable Public Goods and User Charges," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    6. Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    7. Hellwig, Martin, 2004. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-42, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
    8. Martin Hellwig, 2009. "Utilitarian Mechanism Design for an Excludable Public Good," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_12, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
    9. Martin Hellwig, 2004. "Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing: A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
    10. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 12532, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

  30. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6943, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "On Randomization in Coalition Contracts," MPRA Paper 13446, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    2. Patrick Schmitz, 1998. "Randomization in coalition contracts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 341-353, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 1998. "Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern," MPRA Paper 6941, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  31. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden?," MPRA Paper 6937, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Laszlo Goerke, 2003. "Road Traffic and Efficient Fines," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 65-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  32. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1996. "Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6947, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma," MPRA Paper 6936, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    2. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6943, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "On Randomization in Coalition Contracts," MPRA Paper 13446, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    4. Patrick Schmitz, 1998. "Randomization in coalition contracts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 341-353, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    5. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 1998. "Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern," MPRA Paper 6941, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    6. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem," MPRA Paper 6944, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

Articles

  1. Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 147-152, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 119-122, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 577-580, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

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  4. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Patrick Schmitz, 2008. "Task scheduling and moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 307-320, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(520), pages 637-653, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

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  6. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  7. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(6), pages 727-738, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  9. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

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  10. Anke S. Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Endogenous Punishments In Agency With Verifiable Ex Post Information ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1207-1231, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005)," MPRA Paper 6977, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    2. Roland Strausz, 2005. "Interim Information in Long Term Contracts," Discussion Papers 40, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 5747, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:

  11. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  12. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2004. "Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 56(1), pages 72-89, January. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:

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  13. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1027-1046, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

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  14. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 153-173, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

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  15. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Patrick Schmitz, 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 23-28, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," MPRA Paper 12531, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Working Papers 04-21, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    6. Erling Røed Larsen and Dag Einar Sommervoll, 2006. "The Impact on Rent from Tenant and Landlord Characteristics and Interaction," Discussion Papers 467, Research Department of Statistics Norway. [Downloadable!]
    7. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse26_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    8. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    9. Kazumi Hori, 2006. "Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
    10. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2008. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers 7066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  16. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 177-189, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. De Villemeur, Étienne & Versaevel, Bruno, 2003. "Conflict and Cooperation on R&D Markets," IDEI Working Papers 191, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    2. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Licensing under Asymmetric information," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/13, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Licensing in a Vertically Separated Industry," Industrial Organization 0211005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    5. Bharat Bhole, 2006. "Commercial Development of University Research: The Role of Patents," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]

  17. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 444-460, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  18. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  19. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 2001. "On synergies and vertical integration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1281-1295, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  20. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 115-125, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  21. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-, August.
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  22. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the joint use of liability and safety regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 371-382, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  23. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1999. "Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 181-185, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  24. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W, 1998. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 1027, September.
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  25. Schmitz, Patrick W, 1998. " Randomization in Coalition Contracts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 341-53, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998)," MPRA Paper 6972, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 1998. "Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern," MPRA Paper 6941, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

  26. Schmitz, Patrick W, 1997. "Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 52(1), pages 89-101.
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

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