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When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts

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Author Info
Spear, Stephen E.
Wang, Cheng

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 120 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 239-256
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:120:y:2005:i:2:p:239-256

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  1. Wang, Cheng, 2005. "Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model (2008 update)," Staff General Research Papers 12403, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Casamatta, Catherine & Gümbel, Alexander, 2007. "Managerial Legacies, Entrenchment and Strategic Inertia," IDEI Working Papers 442, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  3. Wang, Cheng, 2006. "Equilibrium Layoff as Termination of a Dynamic Contract," Staff General Research Papers 12704, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Leonardo Martinez, 2008. "A theory of political cycles," Working Paper 05-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
  5. Leonardo Martinez, 2009. "Reputation, career concerns, and job assignments," Working Paper 06-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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