Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model
AbstractI construct an equilibrium model of the labor market where workers and firms enter into dyamic contracts that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimal terminations.� Upon a termination, the firm hires a new worker, and the worker who is terminated receives a termination compensation from the firm and is then free to go back to the labor market to seek new employment opportunities and enter into new dynamic contracts.� The model permits only two types of equilibrium terminations that resemble, respectively, the two typical kinds of labor market separations observed in practice: involuntary layoffs and voluntary retirements.� The model allows simultaneous determination of its equilibrium turnover, unemployment, and retirement, as well as the expected utility of the new labor market entrants.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 12403.
Date of creation: 25 Jul 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory
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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
More information through EDIRC
dynamic contract; termination; labor market equilibrium;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E20 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
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Staff General Research Papers
11443, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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