Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment

Author Info

Phelan Christopher

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 66 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 488-506
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:66:y:1995:i:2:p:488-506

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Radim Bohacek, 2001. "Capital Accumulation in an Economy with Heterogeneous Agents and Moral Hazard," GE, Growth, Math methods 0012001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Alvarez-Parra, Fernando A. & Sanchez, Juan M., 2006. "Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with a Hidden Labor Market," MPRA Paper 2531, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Hongfei Sun, 2007. "Banking, Inside Money and Outside Money," Working Papers 1146, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Sun, Hongfei, 2007. "Banking, Inside Money and Outside Money," MPRA Paper 4504, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Aubhik Khan & B. Ravikumar, 2000. "Costly technology adoption and capital accumulation," Working Papers 00-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Khan, A. & Ravikumar, B., 1997. "Costly Technology Adoption and Capital Accumulation," Working Papers 97-12, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Aubhik Khan & B. Ravikumar, 1998. "Costly Technology Adoption and Capital Accumulation," Development and Comp Systems 9802001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Aubhik Khan & B. Ravikumar, 2002. "Costly Technology Adoption and Capital Accumulation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 5(2), pages 489-502, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dirk Krueger & Harald Uhlig, 2003. "Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts with One-Sided Commitment," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000407, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Dirk Krueger & Harald Uhlig, 2003. "Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts with One-Sided Commitment," NBER Working Papers 10135, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Dirk Krueger & Harald Uhlig, 2005. "Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts with One-Sided Commitment," CFS Working Paper Series 2005/07, Center for Financial Studies. [Downloadable!]
- Dirk Krueger & Harald Uhlig, 2005. "Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts with One-Sided Commitment," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2005-003, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. [Downloadable!]
- Krüger, Dirk & Uhlig, Harald, 2004. "Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts with One-Sided Commitment," CEPR Discussion Papers 4208, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Krueger, Dirk & Uhlig, Harald, 2006. "Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1661-1691, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Stefania Albanesi & Christopher Sleet, 2004. "Dynamic optimal taxation with private information," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 140, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Albanesi, Stefania & Sleet, Christopher, 2003. "Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 4006, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Stefania Albanesi & Christopher Sleet, 2006. "Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 73(1), pages 1-30, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Christopher Phelan, 2005. "Opportunity and social mobility," Staff Report 323, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1997. "Credit in a Random Matching Model With Private Information," Game Theory and Information 9705005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Aiyagari, S.R. & Williamson, S.D., 1997. "Credit in a Random Matching Model with Private Information," Working Papers 97-03, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1999. "Credit in a Random Matching Model with Private Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(1), pages 36-64, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Christopher Phelan, 2003. "Opportunity and Social Mobility," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000379, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Radim Bohacek, 2001. "Capital Accumulation And Moral Hazard In An Economy With Heterogeneous Agents," CeNDEF Workshop Papers, January 2001 1B.2, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
Thorsten Koeppl, 2005. "Optimal Dynamic Risk Sharing when Enforcement is a Decision Variable," Working Papers 1050, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2003. "Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable," Working Paper Series 282, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
- Koeppl, Thorsten V., 2007. "Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 34-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ana Fernandes & Christopher Phelan, 1999. "A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence," Staff Report 259, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Fernandes, Ana & Phelan, Christopher, 2000. "A Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with History Dependence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 223-247, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Luis Opazo, 2007. "Welfare Implications of a Second Lender in the International Markets," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 422, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Game Theory and Information 9802002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- S. Rao Aiyagari & Stephen D. Williamson, 1998. "Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information," Working Paper 9807, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
- Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen, 1997. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Working Papers 97-19, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Aiyagari, S. Rao & Williamson, Stephen D., 2000. "Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 248-279, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cheng Wang, 2000. "Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(3), pages 396-422, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2007. "Moral hazard and persistence," Working Paper 07-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2006. "Moral Hazard and Persistence," 2006 Meeting Papers 670, Society for Economic Dynamics.
Cooley, Thomas F & Marimon, Ramon & Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2004. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," CEPR Discussion Papers 4173, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2003. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," NBER Working Papers 10132, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vicenzo Quadrini, 1999. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," Economics Working Papers 843, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2003. [Downloadable!]
- Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2004. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 817-847, August.
Onur Ozgur, 2005. "A Model of Dynamic Liquidity Contracts," Microeconomics 0502004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Onur Ozgur, 2005. "A Model of Dynamic Liquidity Contracts," 2005 Meeting Papers 251, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
Radim Bohacek, 2000. "Capital Accumulation in an Economy with Heterogeneous Agents and Moral Hazard," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp165, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? Authors registered on the RePEc Author Service receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.