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Firm Size, Economic Situation and Influence Activities

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  • Kräkel, Matthias

    ()
    (University of Bonn)

Abstract

This paper discusses the optimal firm size in the presence of influence activities, and the level of individual rent-seeking dependent on the economic situation of the firm. Since firm size has a discouraging effect on the level of individual rent-seeking but also a quantity effect as the number of rent-seekers increases, the interplay of both effects determines whether the employer chooses an inefficiently small or large firm size. In the given setting, a bad economic situation leads to both a higher probability of a substantial loss and a reduction of productivity. The productivity effect and the two other effects together determine the optimal level of individual rent-seeking.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2391.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2391

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Keywords: economic situation; firm size; influence activities; politicking; rent-seeking;

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  1. Baron, David P. & Besanko, David, 1984. "Regulation and information in a continuing relationship," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 267-302.
  2. Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, 1998. "The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 73-94, Fall.
  3. Prendergast, Canice, 1993. "A Theory of "Yes Men."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 757-70, September.
  4. Konrad, Kai A, 2000. "Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 155-65, April.
  5. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 115-125, September.
  6. Inderst, Roman & Müller, Holger M. & Wärneryd, Karl, 2000. "Influence Costs and Hierarchy," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 392, Stockholm School of Economics.
  7. Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October.
  8. David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 1997. "The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment," NBER Working Papers 5969, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Inderst, Roman & Muller, Holger M. & Warneryd, Karl, 2007. "Distributional conflict in organizations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 385-402, February.
  10. Fairburn, James A. & Malcomson, James M., 1994. "Rewarding performance by promotion to a different job," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 683-690, April.
  11. Konrad, Kai A., 2004. "Bidding in hierarchies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 1301-1308, December.
  12. Bagwell, Laurie Simon & Zechner, Josef, 1993. " Influence Costs and Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 48(3), pages 975-1008, July.
  13. Scott Schaefer, 1998. "Influence Costs, Structural Inertia, and Organizational Change," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(2), pages 237-263, 06.
  14. Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June.
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