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Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests

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Author Info
Konrad, Kai A

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Abstract

This article considers the interaction between two types of effort in lobbying contests: effort that improves the contestant's own performance (standard rent seeking), and effort that reduces particular rivals' performance (sabotage). Due to a positive externality, sabotage is a "small number" phenomenon. Sabotage may increase lobbying efforts and the dissipation rate in lobbying contests compared to a situation in which sabotage is not feasible. Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 16 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 155-65
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:155-65

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  1. Matthias Kräkel, 2005. "Doping in Contest-Like Situations," Discussion Papers 46, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Matthias Kräkel, 2006. "Doping and Cheating in Contest-Like Situations," IZA Discussion Papers 2059, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  3. Oliver Gürtler, 2005. "On Delegation under Relational Contracts," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse32_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. repec:bep:thetop:v:6:y:2006:i:1:p:1240-1240 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Dieter Bös, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse27_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. J. Amegashie & Marco Runkel, 2007. "Sabotaging Potential Rivals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 143-162, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Ashish Chaturvedi, 2005. "Rigging elections with violence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 189-202, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Johannes Münster, 2006. "Selection Tournaments, Sabotage, and Participation," Discussion Papers 118, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  9. Matthias Kräkel, 2006. "Firm Size, Economic Situation and Influence Activities," Discussion Papers 167, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Caruso, Raul, 2006. "Conflict and Conflict Management with Interdependent Instruments and Asymmetric Stakes,(The Good-Cop and the Bad-Cop Game)," MPRA Paper 214, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Luis Corchón, 2007. "The theory of contests: a survey," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 69-100, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Philip A. Curry & Steeve Mongrain, 2007. "Deterrence in Rank-Order Tournaments," Discussion Papers dp07-04, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University. [Downloadable!]
  13. Oliver Gürtler, 2005. "A Note on Sabotage in Collective Tournaments," Discussion Papers 61, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  14. Carmen Bevi? & Luis C. Corch?n, 2006. "Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 663.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Oliver Gürtler, 2006. "On Delegation under Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers 113, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  16. raphael soubeyran, 2005. "Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters' Turnout?," Public Economics 0510018, EconWPA, revised 23 Oct 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Carmen Bevia & Luis Corchon, . "Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 541.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  18. Dieter Boes, 2002. "Contests Among Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  19. Felix Höffler & Sebastian Kranz, 2007. "Imperfect Legal Unbundling of Monopolistic Bottlenecks," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse16_2007, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  20. Christine Harbring & Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Kräkel & Reinhard Selten, 2004. "Sabotage in Asymmetric Contests – An Experimental Analysis," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse12_2004, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  21. Oliver Gürtler, 2006. "Haggling for Rents, Relational Contracts, and the Theory of the Firm," Discussion Papers 169, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.


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