This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2003-02-18 (All new papers)

1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999. "On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization," NBER Working Papers 7388, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization," ESE Discussion Papers 117, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999. "On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1880, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999. "On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 375, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2005. "On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 675-702, August.
2. Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, 1999. "Organization Design," CRSP working papers 499, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
3. Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "On the Efficient Organization of Trials," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 745-62.
4. Meyer, Margaret A & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, Donald John, 1992. "Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes," CEPR Discussion Papers 665, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Meyer, Margaret & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1992. "Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 1(1), pages 9-35, Spring.
5. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2000. "The tyranny of inequality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 521-558, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1999. "The Tyranny of Inequality," CRSP working papers 423, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
   • Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1995. "The Tyranny of Inequality," NBER Working Papers 5396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 1997. "The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment," NBER Working Papers 5969, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 2000. "The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2537-2564, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Raghuram Rajan & Henry Servaes & Luigi Zingales, . "The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment," CRSP working papers 463, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
   Other versions:
   • Raghuram Rajan & Henri Servaes & Luigi Zingales, . "The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment," CRSP working papers 357, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
   • Raghuram Rajan & Henri Servaes & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment," NBER Working Papers 6368, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Rajan, Raghuram G & Servaes, Henri & Zingales, Luigi, 1998. "The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 1801, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Raghuram Rajan & Henri Servaes & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(1), pages 35-80, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Warneryd, Karl, 2001. "Replicating contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 323-327, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Warneryd, Karl, 1998. "Distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 435-450, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Wärneryd, Karl, 1997. "Distributional Conflict and Jurisdictional Organization," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 173, Stockholm School of Economics.
11. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics 9809003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
12. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts., 1987. "Bargaining and Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity," Economics Working Papers 8731, University of California at Berkeley.
13. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
    Other versions:
    • Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
15. Luis Garicano, 2000. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 874-904, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1998. " On the Formation of Alliances in Conflict and Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 25-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1998. "The Social Selection of Flexible and Rigid Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 63-82, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Sherwin Rosen, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-46, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Skaperdas, S., 1991. "Cooperation, Conflict And Power In The Absence Of Property Rights," Papers 90-91-06a, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
21. Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Paul R. Milgrom., 1987. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization Design," Economics Working Papers 8741, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
22. Karl Warneryd, 2000. "Inside vs. Outside Ownership: A Political Theory of the Firm," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0985, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Müller, Holger M. & Wärneryd, Karl, 1999. "Inside vs Outside Ownership - A Political Theory of the Firm," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-82, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    • Müller, Holger M. & Wärneryd, Karl, 1999. "Inside vs Outside Ownership: A Political Theory of the Firm," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 344, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
23. David S. Scharfstein, 1998. "The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets II: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates," NBER Working Papers 6352, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Matthias Kräkel, 2006. "On the “Adverse Selection” of Organizations," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse15_2006, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Matthias Kräkel, 2006. "On the "Adverse Selection" of Organizations," IZA Discussion Papers 2396, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   • Matthias Kräkel, 2006. "On the "Adverse Selection" of Organizations," Discussion Papers 168, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
2. Aner Sela, 2002. "Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu)," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000088, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
3. Felix Höffler & Sebastian Kranz, 2007. "Imperfect Legal Unbundling of Monopolistic Bottlenecks," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse16_2007, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
4. Felix Höffler & Sebastian Kranz, 2007. "Legal Unbundling can be a Golden Mean between Vertical Integration and Separation," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse15_2007, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
5. Johannes Münster, 2009. "Group contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 345-357, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Antoine Renucci, 2008. "Access to financing, rents, and organization of the firm," Post-Print halshs-00365983_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
7. Oliver Gürtler, 2006. "Haggling for Rents, Relational Contracts, and the Theory of the Firm," Discussion Papers 169, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]