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On The Efficient Organization Of Trials

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  • Gordon Tullock

Abstract

Since Aristotle, economists have realized that efficient functioning of the economy requires the existence of firm property rights. This is even true of socialists, although the property they have in mind is somewhat different. The theft of state property is, after all, one of the more severe (and, apparently, also one of the commoner) offenses in Russia. The fulfillment of a contract and the enforcement of various rules which prevent people from inflicting negative externalities on each other are also part of orthodox economics. All of this assumes, usually implicitly rather than explicitly, that there is some kind of enforcement mechanism which will see to it that the rules are carried out.
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Suggested Citation

  • Gordon Tullock, 1975. "On The Efficient Organization Of Trials," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(4), pages 745-762, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:28:y:1975:i:4:p:745-762
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1975.tb02172.x
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