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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Kyklos.

Volume (Year): 28 (1975)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 745-62
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Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:28:y:1975:i:4:p:745-62

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