employment contracts, influence activities and efficient organization design
AbstractEfficient employment contracts usually fail to compensate workers for the effects of posthir ing events and decisions when changing jobs is costly. Then, when the re are executives and managers with authority to make discretionary decisions, affected employees will be led to waste valuable time tryi ng to influence their decisions. Efficient organization design coun-t ers this tendency by limiting the discretion of decision makers, espe cially for those decisions that have large distributional consequence s but that are otherwise of little consequence to the organization. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley in its series Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt6pf6c5j6.
Date of creation: 13 May 1987
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rent seeking; influence; transaction costs; organization; incentives; labor contracts; Social and Behavioral Sciences; Business;
Other versions of this item:
- Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February.
- Paul R. Milgrom., 1987. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization Design," Economics Working Papers 8741, University of California at Berkeley.
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