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Distributional Conflict and Jurisdictional Organization

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Author Info
Wärneryd, Karl () (Department of Economics)

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Abstract

The paper explores the implications for explaining the endogenous formation of jurisdictions of modelling the political process as a costly fight to acquire shares of the GNP pie. It is shown, in particular, that a system of federalism is especially significant in ameliorating distributional competition and conflict. Less resources are spent in aggregate on appropriative activities under a hierarchical system of federalism than in a unified jurisdiction with a single central government. Furthermore, if mobility is costless, then a form of federalism may be preferred by all agents even if it destroys resources.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 173.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: May 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Public Economics, 1998, pages 435-450.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0173

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Related research
Keywords: Federalism; contests; rent seeking; jurisdictions; centralization;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

Cited by:
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  1. Sela, Aner, 2009. "Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 7224, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Peters & Karl Wärneryd, 2004. "Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(5), pages 283-290. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2007. "Endogenous Coalition Formation in Contests," ESE Discussion Papers 158, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Konrad, Kai A & Kovenock, Dan, 2005. "Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War," CEPR Discussion Papers 5205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2005. "Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 329-352, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Konrad, Kai A & Kovenock, Dan, 2008. "The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 6741, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Konrad, Kai A & Kovenock, Dan, 2006. "Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability," CEPR Discussion Papers 5844, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Amegashie, J.A., 2003. "A Contest Success Function with a Tractable Noise Parameter," Working Papers 2003-5, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Gradstein, Mark, 2000. "The Political Economy of Sustainable Federations," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  10. Konrad, Kai A & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2007. "Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans," CEPR Discussion Papers 6333, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M & Wärneryd, Karl, 2002. "Distributional Conflict in Organisations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3315, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Political Bargaining in a Federation: Buchanan meets Coase," CEPR Discussion Papers 4188, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2003. "On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within," Public Economics 0312005, EconWPA, revised 04 Mar 2004. [Downloadable!]
  16. Johannes Münster, 2009. "Group contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 345-357, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng, 2006. "The beauty of "bigness" in contest design: merging or splitting?," MPRA Paper 947, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  18. Johannes Münster, 2004. "Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts," Discussion Papers 4, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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