Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Organization Design

Contents:

Author Info

  • MILTON HARRIS
  • ARTUR RAVIV

Abstract

This paper attempts to explain organization structure based on optimal coordination of interactions among activities. The main idea is that each manager is capable of detecting and coordinating interactions only within his limited area of expertise. Only the CEO can coordinate company wide interactions. The optimal design of the organization trades off the costs and benefits of various configurations of managers. Our results consist of classifying the characteristics of activities and managerial costs that lead to the matrix organization, the functional hierarchy, the divisional hierarchy, or a fiat hierarchy. We also investigate the effect of changing the costs of various managers on the nature of the optimal organization, including the extent of centralization.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/finance/papers/orgdsign.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found (http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/finance/papers/orgdsign.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/finance/papers/orgdsign.pdf). If this is indeed the case, please notify (Thomas Krichel)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago in its series CRSP working papers with number 499.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wop:chispw:499

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 725 South Wells Street, Suite 800, Chicago, Illinois 60607-4501
Phone: 773.702.7467
Fax: 773.702.3036
Email:
Web page: http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/finance/papers/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 1996. "The firm as a communication network," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9597, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  2. Singh, Nirvikar, 1985. "Monitoring and Hierarchies: The Marginal Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 599-609, June.
  3. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2005. "On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 675-702, August.
  4. Calvo, Guillermo A & Wellisz, Stanislaw, 1979. "Hierarchy, Ability, and Income Distribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 991-1010, October.
  5. Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1986. "The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 716-27, September.
  6. Qian, Yingyi, 1994. "Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 527-44, July.
  7. Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-46, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Jeremy C. Stein, 2000. "Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized vs. Hierarchical Firms," NBER Working Papers 7705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Dessein, Wouter & Garicano, Luis & Gertner, Robert, 2007. "Organizing for Synergies," CEPR Discussion Papers 6019, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Inderst, Roman & Muller, Holger M. & Warneryd, Karl, 2007. "Distributional conflict in organizations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 385-402, February.
  4. Carroll, Timothy N. & Hunter, Starling D., 2006. "Organizational Design, Organizational Learning, And The Market Value Of The Firm," Working papers 30608, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  5. Andrea Patacconi, 2005. "Optimal Coordination in Hierarchies," Economics Series Working Papers 238, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  6. Moreira, Humberto Ataíde & Costa, Cristiano Machado & Ferreira, Daniel Bernardo Soares, 2004. "Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 525, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  7. Martin G. Kocher & Ganna Pogrebna & Matthias Sutter, . "The Determinants of Managerial Decisions Under Risk," Working Papers 2008-04, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  8. M. Idriss GHODBANE, 2002. "Centralization Versus Decentralization in Credit Lending," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2002002, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wop:chispw:499

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.