1. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Itoh Hideshi, 1993. "Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 410-427, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Guesnerie, Roger & Oddou, Claude, 1988. " Increasing Returns to Size and Their Limits," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 90(3), pages 259-73.
4. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Jean Tirole & Jean-Jaques Laffont, 1985. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Working papers 368, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
5. Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. David Scharfstein, 1988. "Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 147-155, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Sherwin Rosen, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1988. "Hidden Gaming in Hierarchies: Facts and Models," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 64(187), pages 295-306, December.
9. Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Paul R. Milgrom., 1987. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization Design," Economics Working Papers 8741, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
10. Joel S. Demski & David E.M. Sappington, 1987. "Hierarchical Regulatory Control," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 369-383, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 654-672, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. James A. Mirrlees, 1976. "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 105-131, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Michael Keren & David Levhari, 1983. "The Internal Organization of the Firm and the Shape of Average Costs," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 474-486, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Michael Raith, 2003. "Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1425-1436, September. [Downloadable!]
2. In-Uck Park & Chongwoo Choe, 2004. "Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 14, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Choe, Chongwoo, 2002. "Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies," CEI Working Paper Series 2002-7, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
   • Choe, Chongwoo & Park, In-Uck, 2003. "Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies," CEI Working Paper Series 2003-23, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
3. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2008. "Informed principal and information gathering agent," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 229-244, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1998. "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 356, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 1967, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Fred Henneberger & Alfonso Sousa-Poza & Alexandre Ziegler, 2007. "Performance Pay, Sorting, and Outsourcing," IZA Discussion Papers 3019, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
6. Leopold Soegner, 1998. "Regulation of a Complementary Imputed Good in a Competitive Environment," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp056, Vienna University of Economics and B.A., Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 2003. "Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information," IDEI Working Papers 167, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2003. "Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(2), pages 253-279, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2001. "Integration vs. Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 2001. "Integration vs. Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium," Papers 2001-7, Tel Aviv.
9. Chongwoo Choe & Shingo Ishiguro, 2009. "On The (Sub) Optimality Of Multi-Tier Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Motivation," Monash Economics Working Papers 18/08, Monash University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Choe, Chongwoo & Ishiguro, Shingo, 2008. "On the (Sub)optimality of Multi-tier Hierarchies: Coordination versus Motivation," MPRA Paper 13451, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
10. Eyal Winter, 2001. "Scapegoats and Optimal Allocation of Responsibility," Discussion Paper Series dp266, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
11. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1998. "Decentralization and Collusion," Discussion Papers 1210, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1996. "Decentralization and Collusion," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1757, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    • Baliga, Sandeep & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1998. "Decentralization and Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 196-232, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Staffan Canback, 1998. "Managerial diseconomies of scale: Literature survey and hypotheses anchored in transaction cost economics," Industrial Organization 9810001, EconWPA, revised 09 Jan 1999. [Downloadable!]
13. Staffan Canback & Phillip Samouel & David Price, 2003. "Strategy and structure in interaction: What determines the boundaries of the firm?," Industrial Organization 0303003, EconWPA, revised 17 Mar 2003. [Downloadable!]
14. Joseph P. Hughes & William Lang & Loretta J. Mester & Choon-Geol Moon, 1998. "The Dollars and Sense of Bank Consolidation," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 99-04, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Joseph P. Hughes & William W. Lang & Loretta J. Mester, 1998. "The dollars and sense of bank consolidation," Working Papers 98-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
    • Hughes, Joseph P. & Lang, William W. & Mester, Loretta J. & Moon, Choon-Geol, 1999. "The dollars and sense of bank consolidation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2-4), pages 291-324, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-04-01-23-02-48-07, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 27 Jan 2008. [Downloadable!]
16. Chongwoo Choe & In-Uck Park, 2008. "Information Gathering, Delegated Contracting And Corporate Hierarchies," Monash Economics Working Papers 19/08, Monash University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
17. Matejka, M. & De Waegenaere, A., 2000. "Organizational design and management accounting change," Discussion Paper 61, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
18. Jonathan Treussard, 2005. "Life-Cycle Consumption Plans and Portfolio Policies in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton Economy," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-033, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
19. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 2004. "The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries," IDEI Working Papers 267, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 2005. "The design of transnational public good mechanisms for developing countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 159-196, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-04-09-13-05-42-19, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 06 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Celik, Gorkem, 2009. "Mechanism design with collusive supervision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Andreas Roider, 2003. "Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse8_2003, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Aug 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Roider, Andreas, 2004. "Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract," IZA Discussion Papers 1298, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    • Andreas Roider, 2006. "Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)Complete Contract," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(3), pages 391-411, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)