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Privatization And Efficiency: From Principals And Agents To Political Economy

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Author Info
Alberto Cavaliere
Simona Scabrosetti

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Abstract

We survey the theoretical literature on privatization and efficiency by tracing its evolution from the applications of agency theory to recent contributions in the field of political economy. The former extend the theory of regulation with incomplete information to address privatization issues, comparing state-owned enterprises with private regulated firms. The benefits of privatization may derive either from the constraints it places on malevolent agents or from the impossibility of commitment by a benevolent government because of incomplete contracts. Contributions dealing with political economy issues separate privatization from restructuring decisions. They either explore bargaining between managers and politicians or analyse the impact of privatization shaped by political preferences on efficiency. The theoretical results regarding the relation between privatization and efficiency do not lead to any definitive conclusion. Privatization may increase productive efficiency when restructuring takes place whereas its effects on allocative efficiency still remain uncertain. Copyright © 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Economic Surveys.

Volume (Year): 22 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (09)
Pages: 685-710
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:22:y:2008:i:4:p:685-710

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "State Versus Private Ownership," NBER Working Papers 6665, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Kornai, Janos, 1986. "The Soft Budget Constraint," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(1), pages 3-30.
  3. Bruno Biais & Enrico Perotti, 2002. "Machiavellian Privatization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 240-258, March. [Downloadable!]
  4. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bernardo Bortolotti & Paolo Pinotti, 2003. "The Political Economy of Privatization," Working Papers 2003.45, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ilya R. Segal, 1998. "Monopoly and Soft Budget Constraint," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(3), pages 596-609, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1988. "Privatization: An Economic Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262720116.
  9. Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
  10. James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2005. "A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint," Working Paper Series 5605, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology. [Downloadable!]
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  11. William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Bortolotti, Bernardo & Fantini, Marcella & Siniscalco, Domenico, 2001. "Privatisation Around the World: New Evidence from Panel Data," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  14. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Klaus M. Schmidt, 1990. "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization," Discussion Paper Serie A 287, University of Bonn, Germany.
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  16. Pint, Ellen M., 1991. "Nationalization vs. regulation of monopolies : The effects of ownership on efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 131-164, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Shapiro, C. & Willing, D.R., 1990. "Economic Rationales For The Scope Of Privatization," Papers 41, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
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  1. Hai Wang & Weidong Zhang & Jingjing Wang, 2007. "Auctioning the state owned enterprise in China: the trade-off between maximizing revenue and minimizing unemployment," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 267-280, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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