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Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion

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  • Walter A Cont
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    Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 625018000000000122.

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    Date of creation: 26 May 2001
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    Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:625018000000000122

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    34. Gal-Or, Esther, 1995. "Correlated Contracts in Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-100, February.
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