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Bureaucratic Identity and the Shape of Public Policy: A Game Theoretic Analysis

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  • Naseer, Shaheen
  • Heine, Klaus

Abstract

The paper proposes a theoretical framework to explain policy drift, when identity moderates the principle-agent relation between the legislator and the bureaucracy. Our model points to the subtle interaction between different administrative levels of bureaucracy and how this interaction shapes the structure and size of budgetary allocations. Conceptually we enrich the public choice tradition of modeling bureaucracies by insights which fall broadly into the study of organizational behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Naseer, Shaheen & Heine, Klaus, 2017. "Bureaucratic Identity and the Shape of Public Policy: A Game Theoretic Analysis," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168144, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168144
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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