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Organizational Diseconomies of Scale

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McAfee, R. Preston
McMillan, John.

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File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp728.pdf
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Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 728.

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Date of creation: Apr 1990
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Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:728

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Itoh Hideshi, 1993. "Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 410-427, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Guesnerie, Roger & Oddou, Claude, 1988. " Increasing Returns to Size and Their Limits," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 90(3), pages 259-73.
  4. David Scharfstein, 1988. "Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 147-155, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Sherwin Rosen, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1988. "Hidden Gaming in Hierarchies: Facts and Models," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 64(187), pages 295-306, December.
  11. Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Joel S. Demski & David E.M. Sappington, 1987. "Hierarchical Regulatory Control," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 369-383, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 654-672, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. James A. Mirrlees, 1976. "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 105-131, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Michael Keren & David Levhari, 1983. "The Internal Organization of the Firm and the Shape of Average Costs," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 474-486, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Staffan Canback & Phillip Samouel & David Price, 2003. "Strategy and structure in interaction: What determines the boundaries of the firm?," Industrial Organization 0303003, EconWPA, revised 17 Mar 2003. [Downloadable!]
  2. Joseph P. Hughes & William Lang & Loretta J. Mester & Choon-Geol Moon, 1998. "The Dollars and Sense of Bank Consolidation," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 99-04, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-04-01-23-02-48-07, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 27 Jan 2008. [Downloadable!]
  4. Chongwoo Choe & In-Uck Park, 2008. "Information Gathering, Delegated Contracting And Corporate Hierarchies," Monash Economics Working Papers 19/08, Monash University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Matejka, M. & De Waegenaere, A., 2000. "Organizational design and management accounting change," Discussion Paper 61, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Michael Raith, 2003. "Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1425-1436, September. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jonathan Treussard, 2005. "Life-Cycle Consumption Plans and Portfolio Policies in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton Economy," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-033, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 2004. "The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries," IDEI Working Papers 267, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision," Micro Theory Working Papers celik-04-09-13-05-42-19, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 06 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Andreas Roider, 2003. "Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse8_2003, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Aug 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. In-Uck Park & Chongwoo Choe, 2004. "Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 14, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2008. "Informed principal and information gathering agent," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 229-244, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Choe, Chongwoo & Ishiguro, Shingo, 2008. "On the (Sub)optimality of Multi-tier Hierarchies: Coordination versus Motivation," MPRA Paper 13451, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Fred Henneberger & Alfonso Sousa-Poza & Alexandre Ziegler, 2007. "Performance Pay, Sorting, and Outsourcing," IZA Discussion Papers 3019, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  15. Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1998. "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 356, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Leopold Soegner, 1998. "Regulation of a Complementary Imputed Good in a Competitive Environment," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp056, Vienna University of Economics and B.A., Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 2003. "Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information," IDEI Working Papers 167, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2001. "Integration vs. Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Eyal Winter, 2001. "Scapegoats and Optimal Allocation of Responsibility," Discussion Paper Series dp266, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  20. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1998. "Decentralization and Collusion," Discussion Papers 1210, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. Staffan Canback, 1998. "Managerial diseconomies of scale: Literature survey and hypotheses anchored in transaction cost economics," Industrial Organization 9810001, EconWPA, revised 09 Jan 1999. [Downloadable!]
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