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Distributional conflict in organizations

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Author Info
Inderst, Roman
Muller, Holger M.
Warneryd, Karl

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-4JHMJ1H-1/2/7ab0e858c5872a04737d3b983a01a57b
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 51 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 385-402
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:51:y:2007:i:2:p:385-402

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999. "On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization," NBER Working Papers 7388, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, 1999. "Organization Design," CRSP working papers 499, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "On the Efficient Organization of Trials," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 745-62.
  4. Meyer, Margaret A & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, Donald John, 1992. "Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes," CEPR Discussion Papers 665, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2000. "The tyranny of inequality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 521-558, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 1997. "The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment," NBER Working Papers 5969, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Raghuram Rajan & Henry Servaes & Luigi Zingales, . "The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment," CRSP working papers 463, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
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  9. Warneryd, Karl, 2001. "Replicating contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 323-327, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Warneryd, Karl, 1998. "Distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 435-450, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts., 1987. "Bargaining and Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity," Economics Working Papers 8731, University of California at Berkeley.
  13. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
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  15. Luis Garicano, 2000. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 874-904, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1998. " On the Formation of Alliances in Conflict and Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 25-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1998. "The Social Selection of Flexible and Rigid Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 63-82, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Sherwin Rosen, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-46, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Karl Warneryd, 2000. "Inside vs. Outside Ownership: A Political Theory of the Firm," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0985, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  23. David S. Scharfstein, 1998. "The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets II: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates," NBER Working Papers 6352, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Matthias Kräkel, 2006. "On the “Adverse Selection” of Organizations," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse15_2006, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Aner Sela, 2002. "Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu)," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000088, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Felix Höffler & Sebastian Kranz, 2007. "Imperfect Legal Unbundling of Monopolistic Bottlenecks," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse16_2007, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Felix Höffler & Sebastian Kranz, 2007. "Legal Unbundling can be a Golden Mean between Vertical Integration and Separation," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse15_2007, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Johannes Münster, 2009. "Group contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 345-357, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Antoine Renucci, 2008. "Access to financing, rents, and organization of the firm," Post-Print halshs-00365983_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  7. Oliver Gürtler, 2006. "Haggling for Rents, Relational Contracts, and the Theory of the Firm," Discussion Papers 169, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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