1. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Bolton, Patrick & Farrell, Joseph, 1990. "Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 803-26, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Bolton, P. & Ferrel, J., 1988. "Decentralization, Deplication And Delay," Papers e-88-49, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
3. Jacques Cremer, 1980. "A Partial Theory of the Optimal Organization of a Bureaucracy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 683-693, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1995. "Some implications of growth for organizational form and ownership structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 440-455, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Kim, Son Ku, 1995. "Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 89-102, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Aoki, Masahiko, 1986. "Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 971-83, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Coordinating Changes in M-form and U-form Organizations," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 284, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Gerard Roland & Chenggang Xu, 2000. "Coordinating Changes in M-Form and U-Form Organizations," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0780, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
10. Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1997. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 97034, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
    • Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 99009, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Maskin, Eric & Qian, Yingyi & Xu, Chenggang, 2000. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(2), pages 359-78, April.
11. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Brink, R. van den & Ruys, P.H.M., 2005. "Technological change, wages and firm size," Discussion Paper 22, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
2. Hendriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 729, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jean Hindriks & Benjamin Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   • HINDRIKS, Jean & LOCKWOOD, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and electoral accountability: incentives, separation, and voter welfare," CORE Discussion Papers 2005046, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
   • Jean Hindriks & Ben Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," Working Papers 2006-02, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
   • Hindricks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 5125, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Jean, HINDRIKS & Ben, Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation and Vote Welfare," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005038, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques, revised 15 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
   • Hindriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2009. "Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 385-397, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Ruben Enikolopov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Decentralization and Political Institutions," Economics Working Papers 0045, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Enikolopov, Ruben & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2003. "Decentralization and Political Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3857, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Ruben Enikolopov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "Decentralization and Political Institutions," Working Papers w0065, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
   • Enikolopov, Ruben & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2007. "Decentralization and political institutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2261-2290, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Szu-Wen Chou, 2002. "Flattened Resource Allocation, Hierarch Design and the Boundaries of the Firm," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000056, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
5. Panicaos Demetriades & Jun Du & Sourafel Girma & Chenggang Xu, 2008. "Does the Chinese Banking System Promote the Growth of Firms?," WEF Working Papers 0036, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Panicos O. Demetriades & Jun Du & Sourafel Girma & Chenggang Xu, 2008. "Does the Chinese Banking System Promote the Growth of Firms?," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/6, Department of Economics, University of Leicester. [Downloadable!]
6. Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2007. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," IZA Discussion Papers 2973, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
7. Garicano, Luis & Posner, Richard A., 2005. "Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 5186, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Luis Garicano & Richard A. Posner, 2005. "Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 151-170, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. René van den Brink & Robert P. Gilles, 2003. "Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-102/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Brink, Rene van den & Gilles, Robert P., 2005. "Explicit and latent authority in hierarchical organizations," Discussion Paper 75, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   • Rene van den Brink & Robert P. Gilles, 2004. "Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 393, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
9. Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Coordinating Changes in M-form and U-form Organizations," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 284, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Gerard Roland & Chenggang Xu, 2000. "Coordinating Changes in M-Form and U-Form Organizations," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0780, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
10. Heski Bar-Isaac & Mariagiovanna Baccara, 2008. "Interrogation Methods and Terror Networks," Working Papers 08-8, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
11. Rene van den Brink & Pieter H.M. Ruys, 2005. "Positional Wages, Market Wages and Firm Size," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-020/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
12. Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland & Chenggang Xu, 2003. "Coordinating Tasks in M-Form and U-Form Organisations," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 458, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
13. Heski Bar-Isaac & Mariagiovanna Baccara, 2006. "How to Organize Crime," Working Papers 06-07, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Mariagiovanna Baccara & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2008. "How to Organize Crime," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 75(4), pages 1039-1067, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Antoine Renucci, 2008. "Access to financing, rents, and organization of the firm," Post-Print halshs-00365983_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
15. Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 99009, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1997. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 97034, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    • Maskin, Eric & Qian, Yingyi & Xu, Chenggang, 2000. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(2), pages 359-78, April.
16. Kerstin Puschke, . "Task Assignment and Organizational Form," Papers 033, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Puschke, Kerstin, 2006. "Task assignment and organizational form," Discussion Papers 2006/19, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Kerstin Puschke, 2009. "Task assignment and organizational form," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 149-168, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Myong-Hun Chang & Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2004. "Agent-Based Models of Organizations," Economics Working Paper Archive 515, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Chang, Myong-Hun & Harrington, Joseph Jr., 2006. "Agent-Based Models of Organizations," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 26, pages 1273-1337 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)