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Coordinating Changes in M-Form and U-Form Organizations

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Author Info
Gerard Roland (ECARE)
Chenggang Xu (London School of Economics)

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Abstract

We model the coordination of specialized tasks inside an organization as "attribute matching." Using this method, we compare organizational forms (U-form and M-form) in coordinating changes. In our framework, organizational forms affect the information structure of an organization and thus the way to coordinate changes. Compared to the U-form, the M-form organization achieves better coordination but suffers from higher costs due to a lack of scale economies or a lack of what we call "attribute compatibility." The distinctive advantage of the M-form is experimentation, which gives the organization more flexibility leading to more innovation and reform. Our theory applies to business firms, transition economies, and the organization of government. For transition economies, our theory relates the initial conditions of organizational differences with reform strategies, especially the "big-bang" approach in Eastern Europe and the "experimental" approach in China.

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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 0780.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0780

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McMillan, John & Naughton, Barry, 1992. "How to Reform a Planned Economy: Lessons from China," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 130-43, Spring.
  2. Bolton, Patrick & Farrell, Joseph, 1990. "Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 803-26, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Bolton, Patrick & Dewatripont, Mathias, 1994. "The Firm as a Communication Network," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 809-39, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jacques Cremer, 1980. "A Partial Theory of the Optimal Organization of a Bureaucracy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 683-693, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Susan Athey & Armin Schmutzler, 1995. "Product and Process Flexibility in an Innovative Environment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 557-574, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1995. "Some implications of growth for organizational form and ownership structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 440-455, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 99009, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Jeffrey D. Sachs & Wing Thye Woo, 1997. "Understanding China's Economic Performance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1793, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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  9. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1995. "The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 997-99, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Gary S. Murphy Becker & Kevin M., 1992. "The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs, and Knowledge," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 79, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
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  11. Olivier Blanchard & Michael Kremer, 1997. "Disorganization," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 38, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Aoki, Masahiko, 1986. "Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 971-83, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Dewatripont, Mathias & Roland, Gerard, 1995. "The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1207-23, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Gérard Roland & Thierry Verdier, 1999. "Transition and the output fall," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 7(1), pages 1-28, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Weitzman, Martin L, 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(4), pages 477-91, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Ericson, Richard E, 1991. "The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System and Implications for Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 11-27, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. E Maskin & Y Qian & C Xu, 1997. "Incentives," CEP Discussion Papers 0371, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  2. Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1999. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 99009, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Yingyi Qian, 1999. "The Institutional Foundations of China's Market Transition," Working Papers 99011, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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