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A Partial Theory of the Optimal Organization of a Bureaucracy Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Jacques Cremer
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This article models the choice of an organizational structure as the grouping of functions into units to obtain the most efficient coordination between related functions. We derive a simple formula which emphasizes the role of the organization as a reducer of uncertainty.
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Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics .
Volume (Year): 11 (1980)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Pages: 683-693
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Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:11:y:1980:i:autumn:p:683-693Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.rje.org
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