A Partial Theory of the Optimal Organization of a Bureaucracy
AbstractThis article models the choice of an organizational structure as the grouping of functions into units to obtain the most efficient coordination between related functions. We derive a simple formula which emphasizes the role of the organization as a reducer of uncertainty.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 11 (1980)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
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