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Investment in the absence of property rights; the role of incumbency advantages

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Konrad, Kai A.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 46 (2002)
Issue (Month): 8 (September)
Pages: 1521-1537
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:8:p:1521-1537

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Susan M. Collins & Barry P. Bosworth, 1996. "Economic Growth in East Asia: Accumulation versus Assimilation," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 27(1996-2), pages 135-204. [Downloadable!]
  2. Grossman, Herschel I, 1999. "Kleptocracy and Revolutions," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(2), pages 267-83, April.
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Gilbert, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-31, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Konrad Kai A. & Olsen Trond E. & Schob Ronnie, 1994. "Resource Extraction and the Threat of Possible Expropriation: The Role of Swiss Bank Accounts," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 149-162, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Grossman, Herschel I. & Noh, Suk Jae, 1994. "Proprietary public finance and economic welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 187-204, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
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  7. Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto, 1994. "The Political Economy of Growth: A Critical Survey of the Recent Literature," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 351-71, September.
  8. Mitusch, Kay, 2000. "Job Independence as an Incentive Device," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 67(266), pages 245-63, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202, November.
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  10. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 173-202, November.
  12. Ellingsen, Tore, 1997. " Efficiency Wages and X-Inefficiencies," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 99(4), pages 581-96, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Robinson, James A., 1999. "When is a State Predatory?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
  14. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: how the Future Matters," Papers 99-00-11, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
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  17. Easterly, William & Levine, Ross, 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1203-50, November.
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  18. Steven N. Kaplan, 1994. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the U.S," NBER Working Papers 4065, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Conyon, Martin & Gregg, Paul & Machin, Stephen, 1995. "Taking Care of Business, Executive Compensation in the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 704-14, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Konrad, Kai A & Skaperdas, Stergios, 1999. "The Market for Protection and the Origin of the State," CEPR Discussion Papers 2173, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did The West Extend The Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, And Growth In Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 600-621, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  25. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
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  26. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  27. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1998. " On the Formation of Alliances in Conflict and Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 25-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-37, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Lane, Philip R. & Tornell, Aaron, 1998. "Voracity and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 2001, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  31. Paul Collier, 2001. "Implications of ethnic diversity," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 16(32), pages 127-166, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  32. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  33. Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  34. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  35. Ellingsen, Tore, 1991. "Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 648-57, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Matthias Kräkel, 2006. "On the “Adverse Selection” of Organizations," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse15_2006, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Bennour, Khaled, 2008. "The Value of Rents and the Likelihood of Conflicts," MPRA Paper 8379, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Áron Kiss, 2009. "Coalition politics and accountability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 413-428, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2006. "Incomplete Property Rights, Redistribution, And Welfare," MPRA Paper 3438, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2009. "Caps on Political Contributions, Monetary Penalties and Politician Preferences," Working Papers 200912, School Of Economics, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
  6. Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser & Markus Walzl, 2002. "When Bidding More is Not Enough: All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse14_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Leininger, 2005. "The Generalized Stackelberg Equilibrium of the All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Rene Kirkegaard, 2008. "Favoritism in Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps," Working Papers 0805, Brock University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008. [Downloadable!]
  9. Oliver Gürtler & Matthias Kräkel, 2007. "Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages and Litigation," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse14_2007, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Holger Strulik, 2005. "Social Composition, Social Conflict, and Economic Development," Discussion Papers 05-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2003. "Global Threats and the Domestic Struggle for Power," Public Economics 0306001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Feess,Eberhard & Muehlheusser,Gerd & Walzl,Markus, 2004. "Unfair Contests," Research Memoranda 050, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  13. Felix Höffler & Sebastian Kranz, 2007. "Legal Unbundling can be a Golden Mean between Vertical Integration and Separation," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse15_2007, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  14. Kai A. Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 2005. "Succession Rules and Leadership Rents," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Ling Shen, 2007. "When will a Dictator be Good?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 343-366, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Inequality, Democracy and the Emergence of Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 4187, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl, 2005. "Fighting against the odds," Memorandum 03/2005, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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