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Flattened Resource Allocation, Hierarch Design and the Boundaries of the Firm

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  • Szu-Wen Chou
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    Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 618897000000000056.

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    Date of creation: 02 Aug 2002
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    Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000056

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    1. Berger, Philip G. & Ofek, Eli, 1995. "Diversification's effect on firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 39-65, January.
    2. Randall Morck & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1989. "Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?," NBER Working Papers 3000, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Maskin, Eric & Qian, Yingyi & Xu, Chenggang, 2000. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 359-78, April.
    4. Rajan, Raghuram G & Servaes, Henri & Zingales, Luigi, 1998. "The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1801, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Stole, Lars A & Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996. "Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 195-222, March.
    6. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1997. "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE /1997/321, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    7. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization," ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh 117, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    8. Beggs, A., 2000. "Queues and Hierarchies," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics 9934, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    9. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    10. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1998. "Capital budgeting and delegation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 259-289, December.
    11. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001. "The Firm As A Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory Of The Origins And Growth Of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 805-851, August.
    12. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 2004. "The firm as a communication network," ULB Institutional Repository, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles 2013/9599, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    13. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    14. David S. Scharfstein, 1998. "The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets II: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates," NBER Working Papers 6352, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
    16. Bliss, Richard T. & Rosen, Richard J., 2001. "CEO compensation and bank mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 107-138, July.
    17. David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 2000. "The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2537-2564, December.
    18. Stulz, ReneM., 1990. "Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 3-27, July.
    19. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1996. " The Capital Budgeting Process: Incentives and Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1139-74, September.
    20. Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, 1998. "Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, and Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 95-114, Fall.
    21. Hyun-Han Shin & René M. Stulz, 1998. "Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 531-552, May.
    22. Stein, Jeremy C, 1997. " Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 111-33, March.
    23. Rick Antle & Gary D. Eppen, 1985. "Capital Rationing and Organizational Slack in Capital Budgeting," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 31(2), pages 163-174, February.
    24. Toni M. Whited, 2001. "Is It Inefficient Investment that Causes the Diversification Discount?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 56(5), pages 1667-1691, October.
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