Queues and Hierarchies
Abstract
This paper examines the optimal structure of hierarchies when workers differ in the range of tasks they can perform. A hierarchical system may reduce costs by allowing most tasks to be handled by unskilled workers. This may however increase delay for those tasks which must pass through several layers before reaching the appropriate level. The paper characterises an optimal hierarchy when such a trade-off exists.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 9934.Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:9934
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Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
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Related research
Keywords: WORK ORGANIZATION ; COSTS ; WORK STUDY;Other versions of this item:
- Beggs, A W, 2001. "Queues and Hierarchies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(2), pages 297-322, April.
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Àlex Arenas & Antonio Cabrales & Leon Danon & Albert Díaz-Guilera & Roger Guimerà & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2010.
"Optimal information transmission in organizations: search and congestion,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 75-93, March.
- Arenas, Àlex & Cabrales, Antonio & Danon, Leon & Díaz-Guilera, Albert & Guimerà, Roger & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, . "Optimal Information Transmission in Organizations: Search and Congestion," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/3480, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Álex Arenas & Antonio Cabrales & Leon Danon & Albert Díaz-Guilera & Roger Guimerà & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2003. "Optimal Information Transmission in Organizations: Search and Congestion," Working Papers 64, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Arenas, Àlex & Cabrales, Antonio & Danon, Leon & Díaz-Guilera, Albert & Guimerà, Roger & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, . "Optimal Information Transmission in Organizations: Search and Congestion," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/3486, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Antonio Cabrales & Àlex Arenas & Albert Díaz-Guilera & Roger Guimerà & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2004. "Optimal Information Transmission in Organizations: Search and Congestion," Working Papers 2004.77, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Àlex Arenas & Antonio Cabrales & Albert Díaz-Guilera & Roger Guimerà & Fernando Vega, 2003. "Optimal information transmission in organizations: Search and congestion," Economics Working Papers 698, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Cho, Myeonghwan, 2010. "Efficient structure of organization with heterogeneous workers," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1125-1139, November.
- Rene van den Brink & Robert P. Gilles, 2004.
"Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations,"
Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings
393, Econometric Society.
- Brink, J.R. van den & Gilles, R.P., 2005. "Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations," Discussion Paper 2005-75, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Andrea Patacconi, 2005. "Optimal Coordination in Hierarchies," Economics Series Working Papers 238, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- René van den Brink & Robert P. Gilles, 2003. "Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-102/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Benjamin Golub & R. McAfee, 2011. "Firms, queues, and coffee breaks: a flow model of corporate activity with delays," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 59-89, March.
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