Queues and Hierarchies
AbstractThis paper examines the optimal structure of hierarchies when workers differ in the range of tasks they can perform. A hierarchical system may reduce costs by allowing most tasks to be handled by unskilled workers. This may however increase delay for those tasks which must pass through several layers before reaching the appropriate level. The paper characterises an optimal hierarchy when such a trade-off exists.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 34.
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2000
Date of revision:
queues; hierarchies; organizations; submodularity;
Other versions of this item:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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- Rene van den Brink & Robert P. Gilles, 2004.
"Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations,"
Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings
393, Econometric Society.
- Brink, J.R. van den & Gilles, R.P., 2005. "Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations," Discussion Paper 2005-75, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Antonio Cabrales & Àlex Arenas & Albert Díaz-Guilera & Roger Guimerà & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2004.
"Optimal Information Transmission in Organizations: Search and Congestion,"
2004.77, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Àlex Arenas & Antonio Cabrales & Leon Danon & Albert Díaz-Guilera & Roger Guimerà & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2010. "Optimal information transmission in organizations: search and congestion," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 75-93, March.
- Àlex Arenas & Antonio Cabrales & Albert Díaz-Guilera & Roger Guimerà & Fernando Vega, 2003. "Optimal information transmission in organizations: Search and congestion," Economics Working Papers 698, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Álex Arenas & Antonio Cabrales & Leon Danon & Albert Díaz-Guilera & Roger Guimerà & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2003. "Optimal Information Transmission in Organizations: Search and Congestion," Working Papers 64, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Andrea Patacconi, 2005. "Optimal Coordination in Hierarchies," Economics Series Working Papers 238, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- René van den Brink & Robert P. Gilles, 2003. "Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-102/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Dimitri Vayanos, 2003. "The decentralization of information processing in the presence of interactions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 452, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Benjamin Golub & R. McAfee, 2011. "Firms, queues, and coffee breaks: a flow model of corporate activity with delays," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 59-89, March.
- Szu-Wen Chou, 2002. "Flattened Resource Allocation, Hierarch Design and the Boundaries of the Firm," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000056, David K. Levine.
- Cho, Myeonghwan, 2010. "Efficient structure of organization with heterogeneous workers," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1125-1139, November.
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