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Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources

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  • Hiroshi Osano

Abstract

This paper considers the role of equity transfer to strategic alliance partners in mitigating the moral-hazard problem that occurs if a participating firm faces some possibility of reallocating a part of the resources devoted to the joint project of the strategic alliance or retreating from the strategic alliance before completing the joint project. I derive a situation in which equity transfer in the strategic alliance is a component of an optimal contract, in particular, in which equity transfer in the strategic alliance is superior to the contract with the cash transfer only. I also analyze optimal equity stake sizes.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroshi Osano, 2011. "Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(2), pages 202-223, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201106)167:2_202:poasaw_2.0.tx_2-z
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    Cited by:

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    3. Fanti, Luciano & Buccella, Domenico, 2016. "Passive unilateral cross-ownership and strategic trade policy," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 10, pages 1-22.
    4. Luciano Fanti, 2011. "Product differentiation and duopoly: when social welfare benefits from cross-shareholding," Discussion Papers 2011/129, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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