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Intercorporate shareholdings and corporate control in the Japanese firm

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  • Osano, Hiroshi

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Banking & Finance.

Volume (Year): 20 (1996)
Issue (Month): 6 (July)
Pages: 1047-1068

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:20:y:1996:i:6:p:1047-1068

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References

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  1. Kato, Takao & Rockel, Mark, 1992. "Experiences, credentials, and compensation in the Japanese and U.S. managerial labor markets: Evidence from new micro data," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 30-51, March.
  2. Sheard, Paul, 1989. "The main bank system and corporate monitoring and control in Japan," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 399-422, May.
  3. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
  4. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Scholarly Articles 3606237, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  5. Berglof, Erik & Perotti, Enrico, 1994. "The governance structure of the Japanese financial keiretsu," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 259-284, October.
  6. French, Kenneth R. & Poterba, James M., 1991. "Were Japanese stock prices too high?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 337-363, October.
  7. Prowse, Stephen D., 1990. "Institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behavior in the United States and Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 43-66, September.
  8. Kaplan, Steven N. & Minton, Bernadette A., 1994. "Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 225-258, October.
  9. Aoki, Masahiko, 1989. "The nature of the Japanese firm as a nexus of employment and financial contracts: An overview," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 345-366, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Osano, Hiroshi, 1997. "An Evolutionary Model of Corporate Governance and Employment Contracts," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 403-436, September.
  2. Gugler, Klaus & Mueller, Dennis C. & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2008. "Insider ownership, ownership concentration and investment performance: An international comparison," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 688-705, December.
  3. Ang, James S. & Constand, Richard, 2002. "The portfolio behavior of Japanese corporations' stable shareholders," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 89-106, April.
  4. Hirota, Shinichi & Kawamura, Kohei, 2007. "Managerial control inside the firm," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 324-335, September.
  5. Hiraki, Takato & Inoue, Hideaki & Ito, Akitoshi & Kuroki, Fumiaki & Masuda, Hiroyuki, 2003. "Corporate governance and firm value in Japan: Evidence from 1985 to 1998," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 239-265, July.
  6. Hiroshi Osano, 2011. "Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(2), pages 202-223, June.
  7. Luciano Fanti, 2011. "Cross-ownership and unions in a Cournot duopoly: when profits reduce with horizontal product differentiation," Discussion Papers 2011/128, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  8. Fanti, Luciano, 2013. "Cross-ownership and unions in a Cournot duopoly: When profits reduce with horizontal product differentiation," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 34-40.
  9. Shinichi Hirota & Kohei Kawamura, 2005. "Managerial Control inside the Firm," ISER Discussion Paper 0635, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  10. Fung, K. C., 2002. "International Trade and Bank Groups: Welfare Enhancing or Welfare Reducing?," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 212-226, June.

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