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Monetary Policy Trilemma, Inflation Targeting And Global Financial Crisis

Author

Listed:
  • Eda Gülşen

    (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Research Department, Ankara, Turkey)

  • Erdal Özmen

    (Middle East Technical University, Department of Economics, Ankara, Turkey)

Abstract

We empirically investigate the validity of the monetary policy trilemma postulation for emerging market (EME) and advanced (AE) economies under different exchange rate and monetary policy regimes before and after the recent global financial crisis (GFC). Consistent with the dilemma proposition, domestic interest rates are determined by global financial conditions and the FED rate even under floating exchange rate regimes (ERR) in the long-run. The impact of the FED rates is higher in EME than AE and EME are much more sensitive to global financial cycle under managed than floating ERR. The spillover from the FED rate substantially increases after the GFC in EME with floating ERR and AE. The results from the monetary policy reaction functions based on equilibrium correction mechanism specifications suggest that domestic interest rates respond to inflation and output gaps especially under inflation targeting (IT) in the short-run. The response to inflation gap tends to be smaller in IT AE after the GFC.

Suggested Citation

  • Eda Gülşen & Erdal Özmen, 2017. "Monetary Policy Trilemma, Inflation Targeting And Global Financial Crisis," ERC Working Papers 1714, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Nov 2017.
    • Handle: RePEc:met:wpaper:1714
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Exchange rate regimes; Global financial crisis; Inflation targeting; Monetary policy; Policy trilemma;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • F65 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization - - - Finance

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