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An optimal standing timber auction?

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  • Elyakime, Bernhard
  • Loisel, Patrice

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  • Elyakime, Bernhard & Loisel, Patrice, 2005. "An optimal standing timber auction?," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 107-120, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:foreco:v:11:y:2005:i:2:p:107-120
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernard Elyakime & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrice Loisel & Quang Vuong, 1994. "First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 34, pages 71-114.
    2. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 2001. "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 375-417, April.
    3. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    4. Horstmann, Ignatius J & LaCasse, Chantale, 1997. "Secret Reserve Prices in a Bidding Model with a Resale Option," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 663-684, September.
    5. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    6. Tong Li & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003. "Timber Sale Auctions with Random Reserve Prices," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(1), pages 189-200, February.
    7. Vincent Daniel R., 1995. "Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 575-584, April.
    8. repec:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:34:p:04 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2022. "Reserve Prices as Signals," Working Papers in Economics 22/10, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
    2. Onur A. Koska & Frank Stähler, 2017. "When should bidders learn reserve prices?," ERC Working Papers 1712, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Oct 2017.
    3. Eda Gülşen & Erdal Özmen, 2017. "Monetary Policy Trilemma, Inflation Targeting And Global Financial Crisis," ERC Working Papers 1714, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Nov 2017.
    4. Elyakime, B. & Cabanettes, A., 2009. "How to improve the marketing of timber in France?," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 169-173, May.

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