We model public-private partnerships in building and managing facilities for the provision of public services. In particular, we analyze both the desirability of bundling the building and management operations, and the optimal allocation of ownership between the public sector and private firms. When a positive externality exists across stages of production, bundling is always optimal; but unbundling tends to be preferred when the externality is negative. Whether public ownership is preferred to private ownership depends on the extent of the externality, the market value of the facility and the effect of the firms' investments on social benefits.
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