Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Nature of human capital, technology and ownership of public goods

Contents:

Author Info

  • Maija Halonen

    ()

Abstract

Besley and Ghatak (2001) show that public good should be owned by the agent who values the public good most — irrespective of technological factors. In this paper we relax their assumptions in a natural way by allowing the agents to be indispensable and show that relative valuations are not the sole determinant of optimal ownership structure but also nature of human capital and technology matter.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmpo/publications/papers/2010/wp243.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK in its series The Centre for Market and Public Organisation with number 10/243.

as in new window
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bri:cmpowp:10/243

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2 Priory Road, Bristol, BS8 1TX
Phone: 0117 33 10799
Fax: 0117 33 10705
Email:
Web page: http://www.bris.ac.uk/cmpo/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: property rights; public goods; indispensability; technology;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Eric Werker & Faisal Z. Ahmed, 2008. "What Do Nongovernmental Organizations Do?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 73-92, Spring.
  2. Georg Nöldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1992. "Option Contracts and Renegotiation - A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Paper Serie A 417, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Aug 1993.
  3. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
  4. Oliver Hart, 2002. "Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK 02/061, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  5. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1778, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, . "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CRSP working papers 335, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  7. Besley, Timothy J. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2001. "Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Bennett, John & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2006. "Building and managing facilities for public services," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 2143-2160, November.
  9. Fehr, Ernst & Hart, Oliver & Zehnder, Christian, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3889, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & Evagelos Pafilis, 2009. "Reputation and Ownership of Public Goods," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK 09/211, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  11. Chiu, Y Stephen, 1998. "Noncooperative Bargaining, Hostages, and Optimal Asset Ownership," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 882-901, September.
  12. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2006. "Contracts as Reference Points," NBER Working Papers 12706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. David de Meza & Ben Lockwood, 2004. "Spillovers, Investment Incentives and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 229-253, 06.
  14. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, October.
  15. Marco Francesconi & Abhinay Muthoo, 2011. "Control Rights In Complex Partnerships," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 551-589, 06.
  16. Chen, Bin R. & Chiu, Y. Stephen, 2010. "Public-private partnerships: Task interdependence and contractibility," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 591-603, November.
  17. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. David De Meza & Ben Lockwood, 1998. "Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options And The Property Rights Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 361-386, May.
  19. Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  20. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7056, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  21. Grosjean Pauline, 2010. "Maintenance Costs, Outside Options and Optimal Ownership of a Public Good," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-18, November.
  22. Oliver Hart, 2009. "Hold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points-super-," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 124(1), pages 267-300, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," MPRA Paper 53717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 9141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija & Pafilis, Evagelos, 2014. "Location and ownership of public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 395-397.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bri:cmpowp:10/243. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.