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Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information

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  • Schmitz, Patrick W.

Abstract

An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type before or after the investment stage.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 53717.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:53717

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Keywords: asymmetric information; incomplete contracts; investment incentives; public goods;

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References

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  1. Francesconi, Marco & Muthoo, Abhinay, 2010. "Control Rights in Complex Partnerships," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics 933, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  2. Gul, Faruk, 2001. "Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 343-76, March.
  3. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1778, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  4. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, October.
  5. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-59, April.
  6. Besley, Timothy J. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2001. "Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Patrick Gonz�lez, 2004. "Investment and Screening Under Asymmetric Endogenous Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 502-519, Autumn.
  8. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2011. "Investments as Signals of Outside Options," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 8366, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & Evagelos Pafilis, 2009. "Reputation and Ownership of Public Goods," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK 09/211, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  10. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 115-38, January.
  13. Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija, 2012. "Nature of human capital, technology and ownership of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 939-945.
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Cited by:
  1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," MPRA Paper 41730, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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