• NEP-ALL-2000-10-31 (All new papers)

1. Rogerson, William P, 1992. "Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(4), pages 777-93, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1279-1319, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Working papers 494, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
3. Ma, Ching-To Albert, 1994. "Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(1), pages 109-29, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Ching-to Albert Ma, 1990. "Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts," Papers 0004, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
   • Ma, C.A., 1991. "Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts," Papers 29, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
5. Ausubel, Lawrence M & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1989. "Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 511-31, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 257-82, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Aghion, P. & Dewatripont, M. & Rey, P., 1989. "Renegotiation Design With Unverifiable Information," Papers 8912, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques-.
   • Aghion, P. & Dewatripont, M. & Rey, P., 1992. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Papers 9302, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques-.
7. Matthews, Steven A, 1995. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 567-89, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Steven A. Matthews, 1993. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts," Discussion Papers 1051, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
8. Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Wilson, Robert, 1986. "Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 155-190, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1098, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
10. Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz., 1990. "Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency," Economics Working Papers 90-141, University of California at Berkeley.
    Other versions:
    • Hermalin, Benjamin E & Katz, Michael L, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1735-53, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1991. "Adverse Selection in Dynamic Moral Hazard," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(1), pages 255-75, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1993. "Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 811-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Francesca Flamini, 2007. "Long-run Negotiations withDynamic Accumulation," Working Papers 2007_23, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
2. Francesca Flamini, . "Bargining and Investment," Working Papers 2005_6, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
3. Ferdinand von Siemens, 2005. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Papers 57, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
4. Spiros Bougheas & Tim Worrall, 2001. "Cost Padding in Regulated Monopolies," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 2001/07, Department of Economics, Keele University, revised Nov 2001. [Downloadable!]
5. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse7_2006, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Working Papers 04-21, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Campbell Leith & Leopold von Thadden, 2006. "Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and non-Ricardian consumers," Working Papers 2006_6, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Leith, Campbell & von Thadden, Leopold, 2006. "Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and non-Ricardian consumers," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2006,21, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
   • Campell Leith & Leopold von Thadden, 2006. "Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and non-Ricardian consumers," Working Paper Series 649, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
   • Leith, Campbell & von Thadden, Leopold, 2008. "Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and non-Ricardian consumers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 279-313, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Randolph Sloof, 2003. "Price-setting Power versus Private Information," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-099/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
8. Gonzalez, Patrick, 2002. "Investment and Screening under Asymmetric Endogenous Information," Cahiers de recherche 0201, GREEN. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • González, Patrick, 2002. "Investment and Screening under Asymmetric Endogenous Information," Cahiers de recherche 0204, Université Laval - Département d'économique. [Downloadable!]
   • Patrick Gonzàlez, 2004. "Investment and Screening Under Asymmetric Endogenous Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 502-519, Autumn.
9. Hideshi Itoh & Hodaka Morita, 2006. "Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
10. Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2005. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Papers in Economics 518, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]