Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting: Coase vs Williamson

Contents:

Author Info

  • Che, Y.K.
  • Hausch, D.B.

Abstract

Several recent articles have shown that the efficient outcome for bilateral trade, even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting, can be supported with approximately-designed contracts. These studies have, for the most part, restricted attention to specific investments that benefit the investor (e.g., the seller's investment reduces her cost of producing the good). We find very different results for "cooperative" specific investments that directly benefit the investor's partner (e.g., the seller's investment improves the buyer's value of the good).

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 9608.

as in new window
Length: pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:9608

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.

Related research

Keywords: INVESTMENTS; CONTRACTS; WELFARE ECONOMICS;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2001. "Does competition solve the hold-up problem?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3579, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  2. Aaron S. Edlin & Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1997. "Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems," NBER Working Papers 6086, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:att:wimass:9608. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ailsenne Sumwalt).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.