Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts

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Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts

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Ching-to Albert Ma ()

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Ching-to Albert Ma

Abstract

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Paper provided by Boston University - Industry Studies Programme in its series Papers with number 0004.

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Date of creation: Dec 1990
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Handle: RePEc:fth:bostin:0004

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Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.
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Other versions of this item:

Article
- Ma, Ching-To Albert, 1994. "Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(1), pages 109-29, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Ma, C.A., 1991. "Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts," Papers 29, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Aaron S. Edlin & Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1997. "Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems," NBER Working Papers 6086, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Aaron S. Edlin & Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1997. "Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems," Microeconomics 9705002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
repec:bep:mactop:v:6:y:2006:i:1:p:1296-1296 is not listed on IDEAS
Abraham Wickelgren, . "The Inefficiency of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1061, American Law & Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse26_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-006, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick & Matthews, Steven A, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers 3487, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," Penn CARESS Working Papers dfdfbbfe0a5b0e04217a58a93, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
- Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 890-930, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
F. Gul, 2000. "Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s10, Economics Department, Princeton University.
Other versions:
- Gul, Faruk, 2001. "Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 343-76, March.
Steven Matthews, 2002. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics (joint with Mathias Dewatripont and Patrick Legros) Note the special time," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000095, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Dirk Sliwka, 2001. "On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse29_2001, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Dirk Sliwka, 2002. "On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 487-511, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 119-122, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Chong-en Bai & Yijang Wang, 1997. "Agency in Project Screening and Termination Decisions: Why is Good Money Thrown after Bad?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 347., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Chong-en Bai & Yijiang Wang, 1997. "Agency in Project Screening and Termination Decisions: Why Is Good Money Thrown After Bad?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 43, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Chong-en Bai & Yijiang Wang, 1995. "A Theory of the Soft-Budget Constraint," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 298., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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