This paper analyzes the effect of reputation on ownership of public goods in the Besley and Ghatak (2001) model. We show that in the dynamic setup the optimal ownership depends not only on the relative valuations for the public good but also on technology (elasticity of investment). We also show that joint ownership of public good can be optimal in both the static and repeated game but it emerges for a different parameter range. Our results are applied to the case of return of cultural goods to their country of origin.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Boundaries of Public and Private Enterprise; Privatization; Contracting Out Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
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Imran Rasul, 2006.
"The Economics of Child Custody,"
Economica,
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 73(289), pages 1-25, 02.
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