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Control Rights in Public-Private Partnerships

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  • Francesconi, Marco

    ()
    (University of Essex)

  • Muthoo, Abhinay

    ()
    (University of Essex)

Abstract

This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two parties that produce impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties’ valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of impurity is large, control rights should be given to the main investor, irrespective of preference considerations. There are some situations in which this allocation is optimal even if the degree of impurity is very low as long as one party’s investment is more important than the other party’s. If the parties’ investments are of similar importance and the degree of impurity is large, shared authority is optimal with a greater share going to the low-valuation party. If the importance of the parties’ investments is similar but the degree of impurity is neither large nor small, the low-valuation party should receive sole authority. We apply our results to a number of situations, including schools and child custody.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2143.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: May 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2011, 9 (3), 551-589
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2143

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Related research

Keywords: impure public goods; contractual incompleteness; allocation of authority; investment incentives;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(1), pages 56-74, 03.
  2. Eva I. Hoppe & David J. Kusterer & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2011. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 02-02, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
  3. Gordon Rausser & William Balson & Reid Stevens, 2010. "Centralized clearing for over-the-counter derivatives," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 2(4), pages 346-359, December.
  4. Zhe Zhang & Ming Jia & Difang Wan, 2009. "Allocation of control rights and cooperation efficiency in public-private partnerships: theory and evidence from the Chinese pharmaceutical industry," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 169-182, June.
  5. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks," CEPR Discussion Papers 7056, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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