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Modelo de asociación pública-privada: un enfoque de teoría de contratos

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  • Carlos Alberto Barreto Nieto

Abstract

En los contratos de construcción de infraestructura de servicios públicos, el sector privado tiene fuertes incentivos para reducir los costos durante la vida del proyecto, lo que afecta la calidad de la prestación. En este trabajo se extiende el modelo de Hart para evaluar las ventajas de la asociación pública privada, examinando diferentes tipos de propiedad e introduciendo un mecanismo simple de renegociación. El ejercicio indica que la participación del gobierno no se justifica por su capacidad para hacer innovaciones en calidad, sino porque internaliza los costos y beneficios de la inversión en reducción de costos que realiza el sector privado.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía in its journal Revista de Economía Institucional.

Volume (Year): 13 (2011)
Issue (Month): 25 (July-December)
Pages: 249-274

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Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:13:y:2011:i:25:p:249-274

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Keywords: teoría de contratos; unión pública-privada; privatización; incentivos; análisis de inversión;

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References

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  1. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-411, August.
  3. JOhn Bennett & Elisabetta Iossa, 2005. "Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/137, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  4. Crocker, Keith J & Masten, Scott E, 1996. "Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from Transaction-Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 5-39, January.
  5. Schmidt, Klaus M, 1996. "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-24, April.
  6. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
  7. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2008. "The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships," CEIS Research Paper 139, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 15 Feb 2013.
  8. Oliver Hart, 2003. "Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(486), pages C69-C76, March.
  9. Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2008. "To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 393-411, March.
  10. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1996. "The costs and benefits of privatization: An incomplete contracts approach," Munich Reprints in Economics 19773, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  11. Hart, Oliver & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-61, November.
  12. Jean-Etienne de Bettignies & Thomas W. Ross, 2004. "The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 30(2), pages 135-154, June.
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