Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services
AbstractWe model public-private partnershios in building and managing facilities for the provision of public services. In particular,we analyze both the desirability of bundling the building and management operations, and the optimal allocation of ownership between the public sector and private firms. When a positive externality exists across stages of production, bundling is optimal;but unbundling may be preferred when the externality is negative.Whether public ownership is preferred to private ownership depends on the extent and sign of the externality, the market value of the facility and the effect of the firms' investments on social benefits. The main advantage of the public ownership is that it works as a commitment device for the government to share social benefits with the investor.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University in its series Public Policy Discussion Papers with number 02-08.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK
Other versions of this item:
- Bennett, John & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2006. "Building and managing facilities for public services," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 2143-2160, November.
- John Bennett & Elisabetta Iossa, 2002. "Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services," Economics and Finance Discussion Papers 02-08, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
- JOhn Bennett & Elisabetta Iossa, 2005. "Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/137, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Bennett, John & Elisabetta Iossa, 2002. "Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 22, Royal Economic Society.
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-08-09 (All new papers)
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