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Political accountability, incentives, and Contractual design of public private partnerships Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Athias, Laure
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This paper studies political accountability under various contractual forms of Public Private Partnerships. A critical aspect of any PPP contract is the allocation of demand risk between the public authority and the private provider. We show that contracts in which the private provider bears all demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs, since they empower consumers, which provides the public authority with more credibility in side-trading. The policy implication is that the current greater resort to contracts in which the public authority retains all demand risk may not be optimal in terms of allocative efficiency.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
10538.
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Date of creation: 02 Dec 2007Date of revision:
11 Mar 2009Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:10538Contact details of provider: Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219 Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900 Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Political accountabiliy ; Public services provision ; Public Private Partnerships ; Incomplete contracts ; Consumers empowerment. ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Hart, Oliver & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997.
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Economics and Finance Discussion Papers
02-08, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
[Downloadable!] JOhn Bennett & Elisabetta Iossa, 2005.
"Building and Managing Facilities for Public Services ,"
The Centre for Market and Public Organisation
05/137, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
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"Privatizing Highways in the United States ,"
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209, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
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Other versions: Athias, Laure & Nuñez, Antonio, 2008.
"Winner's curse in toll road concessions ,"
Economics Letters ,
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Antonio Estache, 2006.
"PPI Partnerships vs. PPI Divorces in LDCs ,"
Review of Industrial Organization ,
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Grout, Paul A, 1997.
"The Economics of the Private Finance Initiative ,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy ,
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Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2008.
"The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships ,"
CEIS Research Paper
139, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 19 Dec 2008.
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