We develop a theory of public versus private ownership based on value diversion by managers. Government is assumed to face stronger institutional constraints than has been assumed in previous literature. The model which emerges from these assumptions is flexible and has wide application. We provide a mapping between the qualitative characteristics of an asset, its main use - including public goods characteristics, and spillovers to other assets values - and the optimal ownership and management regime.
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Paper provided by Australian National University - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number
343.
Length: 30 pages Date of creation: 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:aunaec:343
Contact details of provider: Postal: THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, RESEARCH SCHOOL of PACIFIC STUDIES, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, G.P.O. 4, CANBERRA ACT 2601 AUSTRALIA..O. BOX 4 CANBERRA 2601 AUSTRALIA. Web page: http://economics.anu.edu.au/economics.htm More information through EDIRC
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
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