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Dynamic Capital Structure under Managerial Entrenchment

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Author Info
Zwiebel, Jeffrey
Abstract

This paper develops a model in which managers voluntarily choose debt to credibly constrain their own future empire-building. Dynamically consistent capital structure is derived as the optimal response in each period of partially entrenched managers trading off empire-building ambitions with the need to ensure sufficient efficiency to prevent control challenges. A policy of capital structure coordinated with dividends follows naturally, as do implications for the level, frequency, and maturity structure of debt as a function of outside investment opportunities. Additionally, the model yields new testable implications for security design, and changes in debt and empire-building over managerial careers. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 86 (1996)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 1197-1215
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:86:y:1996:i:5:p:1197-1215

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  3. Czarnitzki, Dirk & Kraft, Kornelius, 2004. "Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Activity," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-75, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, 2003. "Disagreement and Flexibility: A Theory of Optimal Security Issuance and Capital Structure," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-001/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Joseph P. Hughes & Choon-Geol Moon & William W. Lang & Michael S. Pagano, 2001. "Managerial Incentives and the Efficiency of Capital Structure," Departmental Working Papers 200102, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Neves, Elisabete & Pindado, Julio & Torre, Chabela de la, 2006. "Dividends: New evidence on the catering theory," Documentos de Trabajo "Nuevas Tendencias en Dirección de Empresas". Working Papers "New Trends on Business Administration". 2006-14, Interuniversitary Doctorate Program "New Trends on Business Administration", Universities of Valladolid, Burgos and Salamanca (Spain). Programa de Doctorado Interuniversitario "Nuevas Tendencias en Di. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jong, A. de, 2001. "The disciplining role of leverage in Dutch firms," Discussion Paper 48, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Michael P. Ross., 1998. "Dynamic Optimal Risk Management and Dividend Policy under Optimal Capital Structure and Maturity," Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-281, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Evelyne Poincelot, 2004. "L'incidence de la fiscalité sur l'évolution des structures d’endettement des entreprises françaises - The incidence of the corporate income taxes on the evolution of capital structure," Working Papers FARGO 1040901, Université de Bourgogne - LEG/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance). [Downloadable!]
  14. Zsuzsanna Fluck, 1999. "Capital Structure Decisions in Small and Large Firms: A Life-cycle Theory of Financing," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-069, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-. [Downloadable!]
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