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Contracts, Ownership, and Industrial Organization: Past and Future

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  • Patrick Legros
  • Andrew F. Newman

Abstract

We review the formal literature in industrial organization (IO) that incorporates organizational models of the firm into the analysis of industry behavior. Although many insights have been generated, this "organizational industrial organization" is still in its early stages: a complete theory of the relationship between organizational design and traditional IO variables such as price, quantity, or welfare has yet to be developed. We show how the insights emanating from the incomplete contract literature can be used to address these questions and others of interest to both IO and organization economists: endogenous heterogeneity; the role of liquidity and surplus division in organizational design; the relationship between product price, industry supply, and organizational choices; the response of industry supply to shocks in fundamentals. (JEL D21, D41, D86, L14, L2)

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  • Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2014. "Contracts, Ownership, and Industrial Organization: Past and Future," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(suppl_1), pages 82-117.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:30:y:2014:i:suppl_1:p:i82-i117.
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    1. Philippe Aghion & Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt, 2006. "Vertical Integration and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 97-102, May.
    2. Berlingieri, Giuseppe & Pisch, Frank & Steinwender, Claudia, 2018. "Organizing global supply chains: input costs shares and vertical integration," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 91706, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 23-31.
    4. Aristotelis Boukouras, 2015. "Separation of Ownership and Control: Delegation as a Commitment Device," Discussion Papers in Economics 15/02, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    5. Inés Macho‐Stadler & Noriaki Matsushima & Ryusuke Shinohara, 2021. "Organizational Structure and Technological Investment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(4), pages 785-816, December.
    6. Stiebale, Joel & Vencappa, Dev, 2022. "Import competition and vertical integration: Evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    7. Giuseppe Berlingieri & Frank Pisch & Claudia Steinwender, 2021. "Organizing Global Supply Chains: Input-Output Linkages and Vertical Integration," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 1816-1852.
    8. Gani Aldashev & Esteban Jaimovich & Thierry Verdier, 2023. "The Dark Side of Transparency: Mission Variety and Industry Equilibrium in Decentralised Public Good Provision," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(654), pages 2085-2109.
    9. Kaniṣka Dam & Konstantinos Serfes, 2021. "A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration Under Productivity Heterogeneity," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(4), pages 751-784, December.
    10. Ki‐Dong Lee & Kangsik Choi & DongJoon Lee, 2020. "Endogenous vertical structure and trade policy in an import‐competing market," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(8), pages 1431-1445, December.
    11. P. Giannoccolo & C. Vergari, 2015. "Revealing incentives for vertical integration in the presence of glocal policies," Working Papers wp1015, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    12. Di Giannatale, Paolo & Passarelli, Francesco, 2018. "Integration contracts and asset complementarity: Theory and evidence from US data," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 192-222.
    13. Dam, Kaniṣka & Robinson-Cortés, Alejandro, 2020. "Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market: How does firm entry shape managerial incentives?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 60-77.
    14. Alessandro Bonatti & Matthew Mitchell, 2021. "Introduction to the Symposium on Contracts, Organizations, and Ownership," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(4), pages 743-750, December.
    15. Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew F., 2017. "Demand-driven integration and divorcement policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 306-325.
    16. Chen, Cheng, 2019. "Trade liberalization, agency problem and aggregate productivity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 421-442.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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