This paper analyses the impact of labour demand and labour market regulations on the corporate structure of fims. It finds that higher wages are associated with lower monitoring, irrespective of whether these high wages are caused by labour market regulations, unions or higher labour demand. These comparative static results are in line with the broad trends in the data. The paper also finds that the organization of firms has important macroeconomic implications. In particular, monitoring is a type of ‘rent-seeking’ activity and the decentralized equilibrium spends excessive resources on monitoring. Labour market regulations that reduce monitoring by pushing wages up may increase net output or reduce it only by a small amount even though they reduce employment.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
1708.
Find related papers by JEL classification: J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
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Anthony M. Marino & John G. Matsusaka & Jan Zabojnik, 2006.
"Disobedience and Authority,"
Working Papers
1109, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
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