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From complete to incomplete (contracts): A survey of the mainstream approach to the theory of privatisation

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  • Paul Walker

Abstract

Privatisation is a common, yet controversial, policy in many countries around the world, including New Zealand. In this essay, we survey the literature on the theory of privatisation to see what insights it provides to the privatisation debate. We divide the literature into two periods defined by their relationship to the theory of the firm. In the period up to 1990, the literature followed the theory of the firm in using a complete or comprehensive contracting modelling framework. By the end of the 1980s, the ownership neutrality theorems highlighted a major weakness with this approach. The contemporary (post-1990) literature took advantage of incomplete contracting models to explain the difference in the behaviour of state and privately owned firms.

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  • Paul Walker, 2016. "From complete to incomplete (contracts): A survey of the mainstream approach to the theory of privatisation," New Zealand Economic Papers, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(2), pages 212-229, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:nzecpp:v:50:y:2016:i:2:p:212-229
    DOI: 10.1080/00779954.2015.1059876
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    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
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