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The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 2009: In Quest of Behavioural Insurance

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  • J Fran�ois Outreville

    ()
    (HEC Montr�al, 3000 cote Sainte Catherine, Montreal, Quebec , Canada H3T 2A7.)

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    Abstract

    The purpose of this article is to review and summarize the papers published in The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review in 2009. Asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard are the keywords in several papers in this volume. These papers highlight how applied research in insurance could help understand the behaviour of policy-holders and have important implications for the insurance industry. This is an important issue in insurance and the papers summarized in this article raise some interesting potential empirical research questions and call for a behavioural research approach applied to insurance, a field that could be defined as behavioural insurance.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Issues and Practice.

    Volume (Year): 35 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 3 (July)
    Pages: 484-497

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    Handle: RePEc:pal:gpprii:v:35:y:2010:i:3:p:484-497

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Campbell, John Y. & Viceira, Luis M., 2002. "Strategic Asset Allocation: Portfolio Choice for Long-Term Investors," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780198296942, October.
    2. Kili C Wang & Rachel J Huang & Larry Y Tzeng, 2009. "Empirical Evidence for Advantageous Selection in the Commercial Fire Insurance Market*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, June.
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
    4. John Y. Campbell & Luis Viceira, 2005. "The Term Structure of the Risk-Return Tradeoff," NBER Working Papers 11119, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Ritter, Jay R., 2003. "Behavioral finance," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 429-437, September.
    6. M. Boyer, 2003. "Contracting under ex post moral hazard and non-commitment," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 1-38, August.
    7. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 474, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    8. de Meza, David & Webb, David C, 2001. "Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 249-62, Summer.
    9. Venezia, Itzhak & Galai, Dan & Shapira, Zur, 1999. "Exclusive vs. independent agents: a separating equilibrium approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 443-456, December.
    10. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September.
    11. Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2010. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 39-84.
    12. John Quiggin & Robert G. Chambers, 2007. "Bargaining power and efficiency in insurance contracts," Risk & Uncertainty Working Papers, Risk and Sustainable Management Group, University of Queensland WP5R07, Risk and Sustainable Management Group, University of Queensland.
    13. John Cawley & Tomas Philipson, 1997. "An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade inInsurance," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State 132, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
    14. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2004. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(1), pages 183-208, February.
    15. Hung-Hsi Huang, 2006. "Optimal insurance contract under a value-at-risk constraint," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 31(2), pages 91-110, December.
    16. Michal Krawczyk, 2009. "The Role of Repetition and Observability in Deterring Insurance Fraud," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 34(1), pages 74-87, June.
    17. Spence, Michael & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1971. "Insurance, Information, and Individual Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 380-87, May.
    18. Hemenway, David, 1990. "Propitious Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 1063-69, November.
    19. Cardon, James H & Hendel, Igal, 2001. "Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 408-27, Autumn.
    20. Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P. & Gibbens, A., 1993. "An Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 93010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    21. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-48, July-Aug..
    22. Kuniyoshi Saito, 2006. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market Under Rate Regulation," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 73(2), pages 335-356.
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