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Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard

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  • Schmitz, Patrick W.

Abstract

An upstream firm can license its innovation to downstream firms that have to exert further development effort. There are situations in which more licenses are sold if effort is a hidden action. Moral hazard may thus increase the probability that the product will be developed.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6207
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ying Yi Tsai & Li-Gang Liu, 2010. "Emergence of Rating Agencies : Implications for Establishing a Regional Rating Agency in Asia," Finance Working Papers 22824, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    2. Yair Tauman & Yoram Weiss & Chang Zhao, 2021. "Bargaining in Patent Licensing with Inefficient Outcomes," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(2), pages 321-338, March.
    3. Yair Tauman & Yoram Weiss & Chang Zhao, 0. "Bargaining in Patent Licensing with Inefficient Outcomes," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 0, pages 1-18.
    4. Aleksandra Gregorič & Larissa Rabbiosi & Grazia D. Santangelo, 2021. "Diaspora ownership and international technology licensing by emerging market firms," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 52(4), pages 671-691, June.
    5. Aleksandra Gregorič & Larissa Rabbiosi & Grazia D. Santangelo, 0. "Diaspora ownership and international technology licensing by emerging market firms," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 0, pages 1-21.
    6. Ying Yi Tsai & Li-Gang Liu, 2010. "Emergence of Rating Agencies: Implications for Establishing a Regional Rating Agency in Asia," Working Papers id:2927, eSocialSciences.
    7. Antelo, Manel & Sampayo, Antonio, 2014. "On the number of licenses under symmetric versus asymmetric information with signaling," MPRA Paper 60759, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Manel Antelo & Antonio Sampayo, 2017. "On the Number of Licenses with Signalling," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(6), pages 635-660, December.
    9. Preet S Aulakh & Marshall S Jiang & Yigang Pan, 2010. "International technology licensing: Monopoly rents, transaction costs and exclusive rights," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 41(4), pages 587-605, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Innovation; Licences; Monopoly; Private information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

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