AbstractCan we devise mechanisms that allow voters to express the intensity of their preferences when monetary transfers are forbidden? Would we then be able to take account of how much voters wish the approval or dismissal of any particular issue? In such cases, would some minorities be able to decide over those issues they feel very strongly about? As opposed to the classical voting system (one person - one decision - one vote), we propose a new voting system where each agent is endowed with a fixed number of votes that can be distributed freely between a predetermined number of issues that must be approved or dismissed. Its novelty relies on allowing voters to express the intensity of their preferences in a simple manner. This voting system is optimal in a well-defined sense: in a setting with two voters, two issues and preference intensities uniformly and independently distributed across possible values, Qualitative Voting Pareto dominates Majority Rule and, moreover, achieves the only ex-ante optimal (incentive compatible) allocation. The result also holds true with three voters as long as the voters preferences towards the issue differ sufficiently.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 320.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2007
Date of revision:
Voting; Intensity Problem; Alternatives to Majority Rule; Conflict Resolution;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-04-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-04-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2007-04-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2007-04-14 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Matthew O Jackson & Hugo F Sonnenschein, 2007. "Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions -super-1," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 241-257, 01.
- Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983.
"Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
- Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
- Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2007.
"Inefficiencies on Linking Decisions,"
Economics Series Working Papers
321, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Bhaskar Dutta & Matthew O. Jackson & Michel Le Breton, 2002.
"Equilibrium Agenda Formation,"
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O. & Breton, Michel Le, 2002. "Equilibrium Agenda Formation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 628, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Dutta, Bhaskar & Le Breton, Michele, 2002. "Equilibrium Agenda Formation," Working Papers 1152, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Alessandra Casella, 2002.
0102-71, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- Wilson, Robert, 1969.
"An Axiomatic Model of Logrolling,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 331-41, June.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1998.
"Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems,"
1261, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, November.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Roger B. Myerson, 1981.
"Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information,"
495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2011.
"The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule,"
32716, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- Tideman, T Nicolaus & Tullock, Gordon, 1976. "A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1145-59, December.
- Levy, Gilat, 2004. "A model of political parties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 250-277, April.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
- Storable Votes in Wikipedia (English)
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Wise).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.