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Inefficiencies on Linking Decisions

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  • Rafael Hortala-Vallve

Abstract

Jackson and Sonnenschein (2006) show that by linking collective decisions the incentive costs can become negligible and, at the limit, ex-ante efficiency can be achieved. In a voting situation this implies that the agents` intensity of preferences can be taken into account even in the absence of monetary transfers. Rather than considering a limiting result we want to analyse what can be achieved while we consider a finite number of linked decisions. We first characterise the set of implementable mechanisms and show that ex-ante efficiency can never be achieved. We then proceed to relax the efficiency requirement and prove that, even when we just require unanimity, the mechanism cannot be sensitive to the agents` intensity of preference.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 321.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2007
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:321

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Keywords: Linking Decisions; Mechanism Design; Multidimensional Screening; Strategy-Proofness; Intensity Problem; Separable Preferences;

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  1. Bhaskar Dutta & Hans Peters & Arunava Sen, 2008. "Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 701-702, May.
  2. Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990. "Voting by Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 941, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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  4. Fang, Hanming & Norman, Peter, 2005. "Overcoming Participation Constraints," Microeconomics.ca working papers, Vancouver School of Economics norman-05-04-22-05-35-30, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 28 Apr 2005.
  5. Tilman Börgers & Peter Postl, 2008. "Efficient Compromising," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham 06-11R, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  6. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1519, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H., 1988. "Voting By Quota And Committee," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 95-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  8. Matthew O Jackson & Hugo F Sonnenschein, 2007. "Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions -super-1," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 241-257, 01.
  9. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
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  14. Gibbard, Allan, 1977. "Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 45(3), pages 665-81, April.
  15. Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
  16. Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2012. "Qualitative voting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , , vol. 24(4), pages 526-554, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2012. "Qualitative voting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , , vol. 24(4), pages 526-554, October.
  2. Drexl, Moritz & Kleiner, Andreas, 2013. "Preference Intensities in Repeated Collective Decision-Making," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79832, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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